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A Legal Conundrum - Transsexuals
in Athletics
By LISA M. BASSIS
Member, third year class
Introduction
Transsexualism,' the phenomenon of lifelong, extensive cross-
1. A transsexual is an individual anatomically of one sex, who believes firmly in spite of
all physical or genetic evidence to the contrary that he, (or she) is inherently of the opposite
sex. The transsexual has a fixed and apparently unalterable belief that he is one sex, "trapped
in the body of the other". Donald, The Sex Conversion Controversy, 271 NEw ENGLAND J.
MED. 535 (1968).
The transsexual views his sex organs, male body forms, hair distribution, masculine habits,
male dress and male sexuality with disgust and hate. He lives only for the day when his
"female soul" is no longer in conflict with his male body-when he can function as a female,
socially, legally and sexually. H. BENJAMIN, THE TRANSSEXUAL PHENOMENON 19 (1966).
[hereinafter cited as TRANSSEXUAL PHENOMENON].
The condition known as transsexualism is generally considered to be psychiatric, i.e.,
having roots in early emotional development. Donald, supra note 1. Others feel that genetic
and hormonal influences predispose the newborn to either a male or female identity and
therefore an error in the genetic code and resulting hormonal balance could be responsible
for the transsexual syndrome. Transsexualism, 2 MED. J. AusT., 251-52 (1973).
Nevertheless, the conviction that the individual has the anatomical configuration of the
wrong sex is manifested very early in life, usually by age four or five. Pauly reports that two-
thirds of a group of transsexuals felt that they belonged to the opposite sex by age five, Pauly,
Adult Manifestations of Male Transsexualism in GREEN & MONEY, TRANSSEXUALISM AND SEX
REASSIGNMENT 41 (1969) [hereinafter cited as GREEN & MONEY], while Green reports six case
histories of adult transsexuals whose cross-gender identification and behavior date back to
three years of age or younger. Green, Childhood Cross-Gender Identification in GREEN &
MONEY at 34-35.
Transsexuals should not be regarded as homosexual. The male transsexual feels himself to
be a woman and is sexually attracted to men. Strictly speaking, this makes him a homosexual
provided his sex is determined from the physical appearance of his body. But he, diagnosing
himself in accordance with his psychological orientation as a woman, considers his sexual
desire for a man to be heterosexual, that is, normal. TRANSSEXUAL PHENOMENON, at 19.
Transsexualism has resisted all known psychological and psychiatric treatment. Generally
the patients have no motivation for psychotherapy and do not want to "change back" to their
biological sex. "Numerous attempts at therapy including intensive psychoanalysis, hypnosis,
aversion deconditioning, chemotherapy and behavior therapy have been generally unsuccess-
ful." Pauly, The Current Status of the Change of Sex Operation, 147 J. NERVOUS AND MENTAL
DISEASE 460, 465 (1968).
Currently, the only means to harmonize the transsexual's physical sex and psychological
sex is through hormonal therapy and (often) a sexual change operation. Id. at 463. If conver-
sion surgery is not readily available, the transsexual may attempt self-castration, other muti-
lating acts, suicide, or he may fall into a reactive psychosis. Such self-abuse is not rare, as
Pauly has reported. See Pauly, Problems of Sex Determination and Alteration, 36 MEDICO-
LEGAL J., 174 (1968).
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gender' identification, is not new to either our culture or our time.'
Many sources point to the long-standing and widespread' pervasive-
ness of the transsexual anomaly. However, until recently the law has
been reluctant to recognize and respond to the needs of transsex-
uals, assuming a passive rather than a facilitative role.' Only in this
decade has the law accepted the challenge, setting forth legal pre-
cedents that will assist a transsexual's adjustment in society once
he/she has assumed a new gender role. Recently, attention has fo-
cused on the issue of whether male transsexuals' and others with
chromosomal anomalies should be denied the right to participate in
sex-segregated athletics. The focus of dispute is the disparity be-
tween their chromosomal composition (which would designate them
as male) and physical appearance (which effectively simulates femi-
nine appearance and would designate them as female). In response
to this dilemma, the International Olympic Committee adopted a
chromosomal test of sex.
2. Sex is a term which refers to a matter of anatomy and physiology, hence male and female
are sexual terms. This is distinguished from gender which refers to a mixture of inborn and
acquired traits (learned characteristics). Masculine and feminine are therefore expressions
belonging to the gender concept. TRANSSEXUAL PHENOMENON, at 18.
3. Anthropologic studies have revealed that "in nearly every part of the continent there
seems to have been, since ancient times, men dressing themselves in the clothes and perform-
ing the functions of women." Green, Mythological, Historical, and Cross Cultural Aspects of
Transsexualism in GREEN & MONEY, at 18.
Philo, the Jewish philosopher of Alexandria wrote of those who were grossly discontent with
their gender role, "[e]xpending every possible care on their outward adornment, they are
not ashamed even to employ every device to change artifically their nature as men into
women . . . Some of them . . . craving a complete transformation into women, they have
amputated their generative members" Id. at 14-15.
4. Pauly reports that the prevalence of male transsexualism is 1:100,000 of the general
population, while the prevalence of female transsexualism is approximately 1:130,000. Pauly,
Female Transsexualism: Part 1, 3 ARCHIVES OF SEX BEH. 487, 493 (1974).
"Transsexualism is undoubtedly more common than these figures suggest for they are
based on only those transsexuals who are under a stress sufficient to have them come to
medical attention. Whatever the exact prevalence may be, it is obvious that transsexualism
is more common than heretofore appreciated." Pauly, Adult Manifestations of Male
Transsexualism in GREEN & MONEY, at 57.
5. Because of their ambiguous sexual status, transsexuals' sexual activities may fall within
the conduct proscribed by perverted practice statutes which have been used to prohibit
homosexual acts. Since violation of these statutes depends upon the sexual identity of the
accused, it becomes necessary for society to determine the transsexuals' legal sex. Note,
Transsexuals in Limbo: The Search for a Legal Definition of Sex, 31 MD. L. REV. 236 (1971).
In writing on the legal aspects of transsexualism Sherwin says that "[tihe problem . . .
becomes even more aggravated and complex because the behavior of the transsexual resem-
bles often certain forms of behavior that are defined as a crime by our criminal statutes."
Sherwin, Legal Aspects of Male Transsexualism in GREEN & MONEY, at 417.
6. A male transsexual has the anatomical make-up and chromosomal constitution of a
male, but believes he should be a female. A female transsexual has the anatomical make-up
and chromosomal constitution of a female, with the belief that she should be a male.
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Ewa Kobukowska, a 21 year old Polish track competitor, was the
first athlete to publicly fail the International Olympic Committee's
test of sexual identity. She was ruled ineligible for the 1967 Euro-
pean Cup Women's competition after a six-man medical commis-
sion detected the presence of the male, or Y chromosome.! In 1968,
her name was removed from the record books and the gold and
bronze medals she had won in the 1964 Olympics were taken away
by the International Amateur Athletics Federation.'
In response to the situation presented by individuals with ambig-
uous sexual characteristics that made their sexual designation diffi-
cult, the United States Tennis Association and Women's Tennis
Association adopted the chromosomal test used in the Olympics, as
a condition of participation in the Women's Division of the 1976
United States Open Championship.
Dr. Renee Richards, a 43 year old postoperative male transsexual
previously known as Dr. Richard Raskind, sought to suspend the
required chromosomal test so that she could compete as a woman
in the Women's Division of the 1977 U.S. Open. By September 1,
1977, Dr. Renee Richards had obtained a preliminary injunction
suspending the required chromosomal test, and was allowed to play
third-seeded Virginia Wade in the women's singles of the United
States Open Tennis Championship.' Dr. Richards lost the match
but emerged triumphant, having won a significant legal battle.
Never before had a male-to-female transsexual (phenotypically
female while chromosomally male) been permitted to compete
against an undisputed female. This ruling was in direct contraven-
tion to the widely employed "Olympic Test" which determines the
sex of an athlete on the basis of chromosomal composition.
The object of this note is to examine the question before the courts
and international athletic associations today: "Should male trans-
sexual athletes'o be allowed to compete against their 'normal' female
counterparts in athletic competitions?" This note will examine the
medical criteria essential to a determination of sex and discuss their
appropriateness in formulating a viable medical definition of sex for
7. A Former Male Tennis Player Seeks to Join Women's Tour, N.Y. Times, July 24, 1976
at 16, col. 6.
8. Id.
9. Stormy Summer of Controversy at Forest Hills, N.Y. Times, Aug. 28, 1977, § 2 at 17,
col. 1.
10. For practical purposes, this note will deal with male-to-female transsexuals. To date,
sports competitions have not had to cope with problems presented by female-to-male trans-
sexual competitors.
transsexuals. Next, it will explore the application of these tests in
the legal milieu, indicating which factors have been important in
formulating a legal definition of sex. Finally, this note will explore
the policy of the International Olympic Committee, which has
adopted a chromosomal test of sex for athletic purposes. This posi-
tion is contrasted with the decision reached in Richards v. United
States Tennis Association" which ostensibly set forth a psychologi-
cal/phenotype test for purposes of classifying transsexual athletes.
Toward A Definition of Sex
Legal relations can be classified as those in which the sex of the
individual concerned is either irrelevant, relevant, or an essential
determinant of the nature of the relationship." The criterion of sex
is relevant to retirement under social security regulations, differen-
tial ratings for life insurance purposes, possible marital benefits,
and rights of inheritance. Penal violations may also be involved"
under vagrancy statutes or disorderly conduct statutes."
Sex is also relevant to proper classification for sex-segregated ath-
letic events. Evidence establishes that the male body has a competi-
tive advantage over the female physique founded upon anatomical
differences. This has been revealed by a statistical comparison be-
tween male and female performance ratios in athletic events.' Con-
sequently, athletic events are sexually segregated in those sports
where sexual differences in musculature strength, height, and skele-
tal proportions may affect athletic performance."
These differences in sex are used to justify the various rules estab-
11. 400 N.Y.S.2d 267 (1977).
12. Corbett v. Corbett (otherwise Ashley), [1970] 2 All E.R. 33, 48.
13. In re Anonymous, 314 N.Y.S.2d 668, 670, 64 Misc. 2d 309, 311 (1970). See supra
note 5.
14. Sherwin, supra note 5, at 417. For a fuller discussion of this problem see Note, The Law
and Transsexualism: A Faltering Response to a Conceptual Dilemma, 7 CONN. L. REv. 288
(1975); Note, Transsexuals in Limbo: The Search For a Legal Definition of Sex, 31 MD. L.
REV. 236 (1971); Comment, Transsexualism, Sex Reassignment Surgery and the Law, 56
CORNELL L. REv. 963 (1971).
15. Hay reports a difference of effort and endurance between the sexes of 10-18 percent in
track, 20 percent field, and a 15 percent difference in swimming the breast and butterfly
stroke, due to anatomical differences. Hay, Sex Determination in Putative Female Athletes,
221 JAMA 998 (1972). See also Crawford, Male and Female Olympic Records, 105-106
OLYMPic REV. 367 (July-Aug. 1976).
16. Sexual differences are irrelevant in equestrian, yachting and shooting events at the
Olympic Games, hence no separation on the basis of sex is made in these sports. Experts Say
Competitive Advantage Holds for MD Tennis Star Despite Sex Change, Medical Tribune,
Sept. 22, 1976.
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lished by international and national sports federations and the In-
ternational Olympic Committee to ensure femininity of participants
in sex-segregated events (in order to eliminate any potential com-
petitive advantage). Generally, participants are required to undergo
"femininity tests" which determine the chromosomal make-up of
the individual." However, some members of the medical com-
munity have criticized the use of these chromosomal tests in regard
to persons with sexual abnormalities. Their reasoning is that no
single index or criterion can be determinative of the true sex for such
an individual and that another standard should be established.'"
Toward A Medical Definition of Sex
A person's "core"" sex is determined at conception when the X
or Y chromosome in the fertilizing sperm couples with the X chro-
mosome present in the ovum. A female will develop when two X
chromosomes meet and a male will develop when the combination
is XY." However, a genetic error in chromosomal coupling or mis-
take in hormonal balance2' may produce an individual with an am-
biguous sexual status.22 Consequently, medical science has resorted
17. The "femininity test" of chromosomal gender was first administered for international
competition at the time of the 1966 European Track and Field Championships. Letter to the
author from the United States Olympic Committee (Sept. 12, 1977).
At the 10th Winter Olympic Games in Grenoble in 1968, a small percentage of female
athletes were chosen at random to undergo femininity tests. Now all women participants in
the Olympics must undergo these femininity tests as a prerequisite to competition. Hay,
supra note 15, at 998. See International Olympic Committee Medical Controls, Rule 4.4-
4.4.13. See also notes 109-121 & accompanying text infra.
18. Moore, The Sexual Identity of Athletes, 205 JAMA 787-88 (1968).
19. The term "core sex" (for the purposes of this note) refers to chromosomal sex which is
established at conception.
20. J. MONEY, SEX ERRORS OF THE BODY, 15-21 (1968) (cited in Note, supra note 5, at 236
n. 5).
21. There is evidence that the active process of sexual differentiation in the developing
fetus is dependent upon circulating hormones. It is believed that the mammalian Y chromo-
some contains a gene or genes with a greater proportion of DNA responsible for androgen
circulation and testicular development. It is postulated that androgen acts upon the brain to
program patterns of maleness or a male central nervous system which is responsible for
testicular development. In the absence of this secretory process, the indifferent fetal tissues
will assume their natural course and develop into an ovary. Female development is not
contingent on the presence of an ovary since development of the uterus and tubes will occur
even if no ovary is present. Levine, Sexual Differentiation: The Development of Maleness and
Femaleness, 114 CAUF. MEDICINE 12-17 (1971). See Mittwoch, Do Genes Determine Sex?, 221
NATURE 446 (1969). This position is consistent with the hypothesis espoused in supra note 1,
that transsexualism is caused by a hormonal and/or genetic error.
22. For example, such syndromes may include Klinefelter's Syndrome: a sterile male hav-
ing 47 rather than 46 chromosomes with an XXY chromosome pattern instead of the usual
XY pattern; Turner's Syndrome: a sterile female lacking a chromosome, exhibiting an XO
pattern as opposed to the usual XX chromosome pattern; Metafemale: a female having an
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to a number of factors germane to sex identification. A listing of
factors relevant to sex classification of an individual include the
following:23
1) Gonadal Sex (testes or ovaries)
2) Hormonal Pattern
3) Internal Genitalia (other than gonads, e.g., uterus or sperm
ducts)
4) External Genitalia
5) Secondary Sexual Characteristics (e.g., facial hair, breasts, etc.,
which depicts the phenotype)
6) Apparent Sex (or sex of assignment and rearing)
7) Psychological Sex or Gender Identity
8) Sex Chromosome Constitution
Naturally, in a. "normal" person all of these factors would be in
accord. However, the relative importance of each factor becomes
more complex and the classification of the sexual status of the indi-
vidual more difficult where sexual abnormalities are present. This
can be illustrated by a contrast between the relative significance
given to these factors in the case of hermaphrodites and transsex-
uals.
Hermaphroditism is a congenital condition of ambiguity of the
reproductive structures where the sex of the individual is not clearly
defined as exclusively male or exclusively female." The herma-
phrodite will present an ambiguous pattern of sexual identity under
these factors. He may exhibit the external genitals and secondary
sexual ctaracteristics of one sex but an inconsistent gonadal and
chromosomal make-up. The medical authorities attempt (often
unsuccessfully) to assign the sex of these persons in accordance with
their chromosomal/gonadal designation." In the case of the trans-
extra X chromosome, and therefore displaying a XXX pattern. J. MONEY & A. EHRHARDT,
MAN AND WOMAN, BoY AND Gu. 29-35 (1972) (cited in Note, The Law and Transsexualism:
A Faltering Response to a Conceptual Dilemma, 7 CONN. L. REV. 291 n. 8 (1975)).
23. This list is patterned after one cited in Moore, supra note 18 and quoted in Note,
Transsexuals in Limbo: The Search for a Legal Definition of Sex, 31 MD. L. REV. 236, 237 n.
10 (1971); See also Comment, Transsexualism, Sex Reassignment Surgery and the Law, 56
CoRNELL L. REV. 963, 965 (1971).
24. By definition, the true hermaphrodite possesses both testicular and ovarian tissue.
These unfortunate persons who have the characteristics of both sexes are "assigned" a sex,
which frequently is inconsistent with the sex or gender role to which a person gravitates, often
with tragic results. Holloway, Transsexuals-Their Legal Sex, 40 U. CoLo. L. REV. 282 (1968),
and supra note 2.
25. Green, Childhood Cross-Gender Identification in GREEN & MONEY, at 24. ". . . If
subsequent discovery reveals that the child reared as a male to be a chromosomal and gonadal
female and an attempt is made to reassign the sex as female, it is likely that, if the child is
[Vol. 1374 Coum/ENT
sexual, prior to hormonal or surgical alteration" the gonadal, hor-
monal, genital (internal and external), secondary sex and chromoso-
mal factors are in concurrence and register one sex, while the psy-
chological factor, physical appearance, and possibly apparent sex
older than between eighteen months to three years, the effort at sex reassignment will fail."
Id.
26. Sex reassignment surgery for the male transsexual is a complex process. The procedure
followed at the Johns Hopkins Gender Identity Clinic in Baltimore, Maryland is as follows:
First, the potential patient is thoroughly interviewed, tested and evaluated by a psychia-
trist, psychologist and at least one surgeon to eliminate patients suffering from acute anxie-
ties and psychiatric disorders.
Secondly, the patient completes various psychiatric tests. Hormone therapy to effect body
changes toward the desired sex direction is begun. Chromosomal, endocrine and other meta-
bolic studies are initiated. On the basis of these results, the staff decides whether or not to
advance the patient.
Thirdly, a surgical team composed of gynecologists, urologists and plastic surgeons perform
the sex-change operation or series of operations. The surgical procedure for the male transsex-
ual involves removal of the external male sex organs through castration and amputation of
the penis. An artificial vagina is created by forming the scrotum into labia-like folds by
plastic surgery. Inlay grafting is used to create an artificial vagina which is capable of normal
coitus and orgasm.
Lastly, the patient is followed by the staff, probably for the remainder of his life and returns
for periodic study, evaluation and if necessary, further treatment. Holloway, supra note 24,
at 285-86. Meyers, Problems of Sex Determination and Alteration, 36 MEDICO-LEGAL J. 174
(1968), W. MASTERS & V. JOHNSON, HuMAN SEXUAL RESPONSE 101-110 (1966). See generally
Jones, Operative Treatment of the Male Transsexual in GREEN & MONEY, at 313-334. See also
Money & Schwartz, Public Opinion and Social Issues in Transsexualism in GREEN & MONEY,
at 261 for an enumeration of the preliminary criteria for sex reassignment surgery at the Johns
Hopkins Gender Identity Clinic.
In the less frequent case of the female transsexual, the surgical procedures are more com-
plex and to date have been ineffective in providing the patient with a sexually functional male
organ. Holloway, supra note 24, at 285. See generally Jones, Operative Treatment of the
Female Transsexual, in GREEN & MONEY, at 335-54.
For a discussion of a proper informed consent which would relieve the physician performing
a sex-change operation from criminal liability for mayhem or possible civil liability, see
Holloway, Transsexuals, Legal Considerations, 3 ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL BEH. 33 (1974).
Stoller has commented that the sex reassignment operation is not always the panacea the
transsexual hopes for. "It is not unusual for transsexual patients to request more and more
surgery of various kinds . . . It is characteristic for the true transsexual to push beyond the
limits of what is available and settle for nothing less than that which is conceivable." This
disturbing polysurgical attitude and the restless striving for the ideal female form caused
Stoller to remark: "The general rule that applies to the treatment of the transsexual is that
no matter what one does - including nothing - it will be wrong." Stoller, The Treatment
of Transvestitism and Transsexualism, in Masserman (ed.), VI CURRENT PSYCHIATRIC
THERAPIES (1966). See also Pauly, Adult Manifestations of Male Transsexualism in GREEN &
MONEY, at 47.
Furthermore, the sex change operation may be utilized for disabilities other than transsex-
ualism. For inbstance, a 3 year old child who was born male underwent a sex change operation
due to defendant military physician's alleged negligence in performing a routine circumcision
when the child was five months old. The child's genital area had been so badly burned that
a specialist suggested that the child's sex be changed to female. [March 2, 1976] 13 VERDICT
REPORTS (Jury Verdict Research, Inc.) No. 17.
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are discordant." Prior to sex reassignment, the transsexual will be
classified in accordance with chromosomal sex, while after sex reas-
signment the transsexual may or may not be reclassified by the
psychological/phenotype test. (The latter will depend on the juris-
diction in which the action is brought and the purpose for which the
change in sex designation is sought).
Returning to the issue of the sexual determination of putative
female athletes, one realizes that a designation of their sex is essen-
tial but exceedingly difficult. Utilization of a test which relies on the
concurrence of these factors is not accurate in the case of herma-
phrodites and transsexuals, as these syndromes are characterized by
ambiguous or conflicting factors. The use of a simple majority of
agreeing factors would be inconclusive as it incorrectly assumes
each factor is of equal significance. 28 Therefore, if this method were
adopted, hermaphrodites and transsexuals would remain unclassi-
fied. As demonstrated above, the relative weight of these eight fac-
tors germane to sex classification of an individual will shift with the
type of syndrome and will vary depending upon the purpose for
which a determination of sex is required. With this context in mind,
an examination of the viability of each of these factors pertinent to
a determination of sex will be made.
The Gonadal Standard
A gonadal standard relies upon the presence of the ovaries or
testes for identifying the sex of the individual; an individual with
ovaries would be female, and an individual with testes would be
male. However, the gonadal standard is inadequate in regard to
sexual designation for both hermaphrodites and transsexuals. Her-
maphrodites possess both testicular and ovarian tissue in their gon-
ads, making this standard inapplicable. Furthermore, this standard
is without value in the case of transsexuals since the gonadal tissue
is removed in sex reassignment surgery, eliminating this as a crite-
rion for sex determination.
27. Some transsexuals may have been reared in an opposite sex pattern. Stoller reports
that mothers of male transsexuals actively encouraged and rewarded their sons for dressing
and emulating the opposite sex, thereby reinforcing opposite sex behavior. Stoller, A Further
Contribution to the Study of Gender Identity, 49 INTERNAT. J. OF PSYCHOANALYSIs 364-369
(1968).
28. Comment, Transsexualism, Sex Reassignment Surgery and the Law, 56 CORNELL L.
REV. 966 (quoted from Stutte, Legal Problems Related to Chromosomes, Abnormalities and
Intersex, 33 ACTA PAEDOPSYCHIATRICA 241, 242-243 (1966)).
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The Hormonal Standard
Sex hormone balance refers to the endocrinological make-up of an
individual. Although every person has both estrogens and androgens
present in his/her body, it is the relative predominance of estrogens
to androgens that is responsible for breasts and rounded contours
in women and the androgen to estrogen predominance which is re-
sponsible for facial hair and the more pronounced muscle configura-
tion in men. The hormonal test identifies the amounts of androgens
and estrogens in the body and identifies sex on the basis of the
predominance of one of these hormones.
Sex hormone balance is a mere tangential index of sex and is
inadequate as a standard. It can be easily varied by the administra-
tion of drugs and by castration, both routine procedures in sex reas-
signment surgery.29 For example, the ratio of androgens to estrogens
in the male transsexual is typically altered by ingestion of estrogens,
as estrogen is a functional castrating agent in the normal male and
inhibits testicular production of androgen. This will have the effect
of reducing muscular mass and initiating the development of
breasts and other feminine characteristics. Hence, the hormonal
balance is inappropriate as a determinant of sex due to its amena-
bility to manipulation.
Genital Sex (Internal and External)
The internal and external genitalia factors are also inadequate as
a medical standard of sex. The internal genitalia refer to the pres-
ence of the uterus or sperm ducts. Sexual identity is based upon the
presence of one of these structures. By this criterion, the individual
with a uterus would be a female, and the individual with sperm
ducts would be a male. However, the internal organs in herma-
phrodites are variable, with components of both the male and the
female (often with female development on the side of the ovary and
male development on the side of the testes)30 making this test in-
applicable to hermaphrodites.
For the transsexual who has undergone sex reassignment, this test
is equally inapplicable, as the internal genitalia are removed as part
of the surgery, and the criteria for judging sex is thereby eliminated.
29. This hormonal variation will produce gradual but significant changes in the secondary
sex characteristics. See generally Hamburger, Endocrine Treatment of Male and Female
Transsexualism in GREEN AND MONEY, at 291.
30. Money, Sex Reassignment as Related to Hermaphroditism and Transsexualism in
GREEN & MONEY, at 99.
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The external genitalia are the penis in the male and the labia and
clitoris in the female. These are typically unfinished as male or
female in hermaphrodites." These ambiguities have caused mis-
takes in sex designation of newborn children since sexual determi-
nation at birth is generally based upon a cursory examination of the
external genitalia of the child by the attending physician or other
person in attendance. The child's apparent sex is then recorded on
the birth certificate.32 Although infrequent, there have been instan-
ces where doctors have been in error as to the sex of the child due
to an ambiguous and misleading genital appearance."
The external genitalia is also an inappropriate standard for the
postoperative transsexual, since these organs are removed in the sex
reassignment process. Therefore, due to such anomalies as herma-
phroditism and medically altered transsexuals, the internal and
external genitalia diminish in significance as accurate determinants
of sex.
Secondary Sexual Characteristics
The secondary sex characteristics: distribution of body hair, mus-
cle mass, and presence of breasts, give an impression of sex. How-
ever, the phenotype (physical appearance) of an individual may not
conform with the genetic configuration, as is the case with herma-
phrodites.
The secondary sex characteristics for transsexuals are also ame-
nable to manipulation by hormonal changes, an integral part of the
sex reassignment process. Consequently, this factor is unreliable as
a determinant of sex in both the hermaphrodite and transsexual.
Apparent Sex
Apparent sex enables the individual to be designated by the sex
in which he has been raised, despite the presence of inconsistent
31. Id.
32. Many states have enacted statutes to deal with problems presented by a birth certifi-
cate inscribed with the wrong sex. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-02-20 (1960); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 53-419 (1966). See also Holloway, supra note 24, at 289, for a discussion of these
"correction statutes."
33. See Kaufman v. Israel Zion Hospital, 132 Misc. 714, 51 N.Y.S.2d 412 (1944). There the
doctor informed the parents that their child was a male and two days later informed the
parents of his error. The parents sued for mental distress suffered because of misinformation.
Recovery for mental distress was denied due to the absence of any accompanying physical
injury. See Holloway, supra note 24, at 282, 286; Pauly, Adult Manifestations of Male
Transsexualism in GREEN & MONEY, at 48.
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organs. Dr. John Money of the Johns Hopkins Gender Identity
Clinic in Baltimore, Maryland, has observed that when the external
genitalia look normal and agree with assigned sex in hermaphrod-
ites, sex reassignment is not ordinarily requested by the herma-
phrodite, regardless of other hidden disparities of sex." In other
words, the role of rearing and sex assignment at birth has a signifi-
cant impact on the establishment of a core gender identity in spite
of disparate internal organs and chromosomal arrangement.35
Notwithstanding the fact that the utilization of apparent sex as
a standard ignores chromosomal composition, this test appears both
flexible and adaptable enough to apply to the hermaphrodite. How-
ever, closer examination reveals that it is inapplicable to the trans-
sexual. The sex of rearing is generally discordant with the clinical
history of transsexuals, most of whom are raised in their anatomical
sex role but nevertheless persist in an unalterable identification
with the opposite sex from an early age.3 1
The Psychological Test
In contrast, the psychological test is appealing because it hu-
manely recognizes the sex that the individual has felt himself to be
all along. This test initially appears applicable to the hermaphrod-
ite as it entails a determination of sex on the basis of psychological
orientation. However, sole use of the psychological test would ex-
clude consideration of other, possibly discordant, sex factors. For
example, the hermaphrodite may have the psychological orienta-
tion, hormonal balance, and physical appearance of a female, yet
34. Money, Sex Reassignment as Related to Hermaphroditism and Transsexualism in
GREEN AND MONEY, at 113. Given two cases of female adrenogenitalism, appearing identical
at birth, with one designated male and brought up as such, and the other female and consis-
tently reared, the former will typically develop a male gender identity and the latter a female
identity, dramatizing the profound influence environmental factors may have in determining
the direction of gender identity and the significance of early gender-role orientation. Green,
Childhood Cross-Gender Identification in GREEN & MONEY, at 23-24.
35. However, see 2 MED. J. AusT., supra note 1, at 251-52, which refers to contrary results
in another study by Diamond in 40 QUARTERLY REv. BIOLOGY 147 (1965). Here children with
sexual abnormalities were accidently given the wrong sex at birth. It was found that in spite
of rearing in the wrong sex, the children desired to change sex consistent with their genetic
and hormonal designation. This request for change sometimes followed the spontaneous
request of the child and sometimes was made with knowledge that the wrong sex had been
assigned at birth. They were able to assume this new role without distress or difficulty, in
opposition to the belief expressed at supra note 25, that sex reassignment beyond a certain
age is improbable, if not impossible, where such a change is not requested by the individual.
36. Comment, Transsexualism, Sex Reassignment Surgery and the Law, 56 CORNELL L.
REv. 968 (1971). See also supra note 1.
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have the gonadal and chromosomal designation of a male. Conse-
quently, exclusive use of the psychological test to determine sex
may provide a skewed and grossly inaccurate designation of "core"
sex by ignoring other important factors which form the composite
individual. These factors also demand attention and evaluation in
reaching a final determination of sex.
Of crucial importance to a determination of sex is the purpose for
which it is ascertained. It has been suggested that, for the limited
purpose of facilitating a transsexual's adjustment in society, a psy-
chological test be adopted for male transsexuals after sex reassign-
ment surgery.37
The psychological test, although practical for some purposes, is
severely deficient for athletic purposes, as it considers none of the
physical and hormonal differences between the sexes that affect
athletic ability, specifically: musculature, skeletal mass, height,
weight, heart and lung size." Since these physical differences are
indirectly reflected in the results of the chromosomal test, the latter
test is a more appropriate determinant of sex in the sports milieu
than the psychological test.
37. This viewpoint is in accord with that of legal scholars who have recommended the
psychological test as being at once practical, realistic, and humane for the postoperative
transsexual. Comment, supra note 36, at 970. However, such a test would be inapplicable to
a transsexual prior to surgical reassignment since such an individual would have the physical
attributes of a male while being psychologically female. It would be absurd to classify a
preoperative male transsexual as a female. When there is no surgical intervention, legal sex
must conform with anatomical sex, regardless of the transsexual's psychological orientation.
See Stlrup, Legal Problems Related to Transsexualism and Sex Reassignment in Denmark
in GREEN & MONEY, at 453 where Stirup describes an interesting account of problems that
occurred when a change of name for a female transsexual was granted prior to the sex change
operation.
38. See supra note 15. Preliminary studies on rats support the assertion that the male body
operates and responds to stimuli in a different manner than the female body. There is
evidence that the male or female brain triggers hormonal secretion in different amounts, thus
accounting for different behavior and activity levels in accordance with sex. Male rats showed
higher aggression levels than the females. Further, if a male rat was castrated at weaning,
his aggressive behavior was reduced, but not quite to the level seen in normal females. If these
males received replacement treatment with testosterone, the males showed significant in-
creases in aggressive behavior equivalent to that in a normal uncastrated male with the
exception that there was a maintenance of other feminine behavior patterns in the castrated
male.
Drawing a corollary to postoperative transsexuals, one must consider that there may be a
subtle, but residual effect, of the male hormone testosterone on aggression levels, strength
and other behavior in the surgically altered male to female transsexual. Levine, supra note
21, at 12-17.
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The Chromosomal Test
The chromosomal test" indicates sex on the basis of chromosomal
arrangement.'" An XX chromosomal pattern indicates that the
chromosomal composition of the individual is female, while the XY
pattern indicates that the chromosomal composition of the individ-
ual is male. Generally, the phenotype (physical appearance) reflects
this chromosomal arrangement.
The chromosomal testing procedure is relatively simple. A tissue
scraping is taken from the buccal mucous membrane (the inner
cheek cells) and then is microscopically examined for the presence
of the X chromosome, or more specifically, the Barr body which is
a chromatin mass found only in the nuclei of normal women. Each
human cell contains 23 pairs of chromosomes, 22 of which are identi-
cal in the normal male and normal female. The 23rd pair, the sex
chromosomes, differ in the male and female. In the female, this 23rd
pair contains two like structures, the two X chromosomes. In the
male, the 23rd pair are unalike, consisting of a larger X and a
smaller Y chromosome. The second X in the female pattern is the
Barr body. Upon staining the slide, the XX pattern becomes percep-
tible, producing a positive Barr body test.4 ' The Barr body test has
been used by the Olympic Committee as a screening device for
women's events since the 1968 Olympics.4 2
If the Barr body test proves inconclusive, the examinee's kary-
otype, or chromosomal map, is examined. 3 For this test, a cell sam-
ple is grown for several days. Then a microscopic examination of the
dividing cell reveals the precise chromosomal make-up. As a screen-
ing process, these chromosomal tests are scientifically accurate (the
39. The chromosomal test may also be called the Olympic test or Barr body test. However,
these terms can be a source of confusion. The "chromosomal test" refers to a procedure that
identifies chromosomal composition. Within the athletic milieu this procedure consists of two
tests; the Barr body and karyotype tests which differ in precision. However, the term
"chromosomal test" may also refer to the Barr body test alone, making it difficult to deter-
mine whether the composite chromosomal test or merely one part of the chromosomal test is
the subject of discussion.
40. For a discussion of whether sex classification in accordance with the chromosomal test
constitutes a violation of a transsexual's right to equal protection within the context of
marriage and birth certificate changes, see Note, Transsexuals in Search of Legal Acceptance:
The Constitutionality of the Chromosome Test, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 331 (1978).
41. G. VALENTINE, THE CHROMOSOME DISORDERS, 12-14 (2d ed. 1969).
42. Affidavit of Daniel D. Federman at 2-4, Richards v. U.S.T.A. Inc., 400 N.Y.S.2d 267
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Federman Affidavit].
43. Hay, supra note 15, at 998. See Games of the XXI Olympiad, Montreal 1976, Interna-
tional Olympic Committee Medical Controls, Rule 4.4.10 at 53.
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karyotype test is 100% effective) and do not subject the competitor
to either embarrassment or inconvenience." In the Olympics, blood
tests and a gynecological examination are made when an irregular-
ity is apparent."
Although the Barr body test may be inconclusive when applied
to those afflicted with various chromosomal disorders such as Kline-
felter's Syndrome, Turner's Syndrome, or for those people classified
as metafemale," the back-up karyotype test will accurately identify
these syndromes.
The chromosomal test may be inappropriate to classify (for gen-
eral purposes) the sex of hermaphrodites and transsexuals who have
the physical appearance of one sex but the chromosomal arrange-
ment of the other. Sex designation at odds with physical appearance
would impair rather than facilitate that individual's adjustment in
society. Consequently, this test has gathered much criticism:
The "chromosomal sex" is merely of abstract, scientific, and theo-
retical interest in the case of transsexuals. Nobody can see an XX
or XY constellation.
To insist that a person must live and be legally classified in
accordance with his or her chromosomal sex violates common sense
as well as humanity. It reduces science to a mere technicality and
an absurd one at that. With the same justification, one may insist
that Rembrandt's works are not his paintings, but pieces of canvas
covered with paint. Accurate but asinine."
It must be noted that the opponents of the chromosomal test have
not considered the express purpose behind its application to the
athletic setting-to insure fairness. As previously stated, the appro-
priateness of a test of sex will vary with the purpose for which it is
44. Federman Affidavit at 7.
45. Games of the XXI Olympiad, Montreal 1976, International Olympic Committee Medi-
cal Controls, Rule 4.4.12 at 53.
46. See supra note 22.
47. Comment, supra note 36, at 969.
In lieu of the chromosomal test, another ascerbic critic has suggested:
[Chromosomal arrangement notwithstandingl . . . females should be declared
ineligible for sports competition "only when they exhibit advanced male character-
istics; male external genitals and physique, unusual growth of hair on the face or
who have levels of plasma testosterone similar to males.
Moore, The Sexual Identity of Athletes, 205 JAMA 787-7 (1968). Obviously the latter test
would be ineffectual when applied to a chromosomal male with a genetic disorder that gives
him a feminine appearance or for the "feminized" male-to-female transsexual who, having
undergone electrolysis, breast implantation surgery, castration, penile amputation, and con-
struction of an artificial vagina in the course of sex reassignment, appears in every regard to
be a female.
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employed. For example, the chromosomal test will be an inaccurate
standard in determining the sex of a hermaphrodite or transsexual
for purposes of marriage, change of legal documents, estate plan-
ning, criminal prosecution, etc." However, the chromosomal test is
more reasonable in the athletic milieu, as it fulfills an explicit and
rational purpose.
There is a significant percentage difference in athletic perform-
ance between the male body and the female body." Although the
chromosomal or Barr body test does not screen relative muscular
mass, skeletal proportion, and other physical characteristics that
are unique to the sexes, it does establish the identity of the chroma-
tin material that programs these differences. The chromosomal test
is therefore desirable to determine sex in athletics as it identifies
quantitative biological differences influential to sports performance.
It is evident that any test used to determine sex for transsexuals in
the sports milieu, which fails to consider biological differences, will
erode the competitive aspect of sports by failing to screen out partic-
ipants with an unfair competitive advantage.
Toward a Legal Definition of Sex
From a historical vantage, man has recognized but two distinct
sexes, male and female, and has incorporated this perspective, al-
beit an archaic one, into our legal system. Consequently, there has
been no legislation classifying the permutations of male and female
which medical science has recognized.
As previously discussed, these anomalies raise serious questions
as to the pertinent factors used to determine one's sex. The appro-
priate test is dependent upon the purpose for which the sex designa-
tion is being ascertained. As one writer astutely stated:
. . . it seems to follow that any attempt to define sex for legal
purposes must take into account the specific purpose for which the
classification is required, for it does not follow that what is a suita-
ble criterion for one purpose will necessarily be suitable for another
purpose. 0
For instance, a chromosomal test is inappropriate when applied to
a postoperative male-to-female transsexual applying for a change of
48. Note, Transsexuals in Limbo: The Search for a Legal Definition of Sex, 31 MD. L. REV.
236 (1975).
49. See supra note 15.
50. Bartholemew, Hermaphrodites and the Law, 2 MALAYA L. REv. 83, 97 (1960).
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name from a male name to an obviously female name;" but it would
be appropriate as a condition to participation in athletic competi-
tions due to anatomical differences between the sexes.
Courts have been reluctant to attempt a legal definition of sex to
avoid opening the Pandoras Box such a consideration would entail.
Certainly, the parameters of sex are both complex and confusing,
as is evidenced by the skeletal knowledge presently available of the
transsexual syndrome, only recently acknowledged and described
by medical science.52 Nevertheless, society dictates that the Courts
must keep abreast with the rapid strides of the medical profession
and respond to such novel situations as may be presented.
Only a handful of courts have considered issues raised by male-
to-female transsexuals. Although the majority have not explicitly
formulated a legal definition of sex, one can infer from their deci-
sions which indicium is controlling in determining legal sex. One
such case, an English decision, Corbett v. Corbett (otherwise
Ashley)" did formulate a legal definition of sex. Although without
precedential value in our courts, the Corbett case has been influen-
tial in American jurisdictions considering similar issues.
The Genesis of a Legal Test-Corbett
The English case of Corbett v Corbett5 considered the validity of
a marriage between a male transsexual and her "normal"" male
spouse. This required a determination of the true sex of the trans-
51. For a discussion of this problem in the preoperative and postoperative transsexual see
In the Matter of Anonymous, 293 N.Y.S.2d 834, 837, 57 Misc. 2d 813, 815 (1968).
52. Although the phenomenon of transsexualism is centuries old, (see supra note 3) the
research in the area of sex differentiation, including transsexualism, has principally been
undertaken in the last fifteen years.
Dr. Harry Benjamin states in the preface to his book, THE TRANS8EXUAL PHENOMENON:
There is a challenge as well as a handicap in writing a book on the subject that is
not yet covered in the medical literature. Transsexualism is such a subject . .. The
handicap lies in the absence of all previous observations to which to compare one's
own . . . The challenge lies in the novelty of these observations and in the attempt
to describe clinical pictures and events without preconceived notions.
THE TRANSSEXUAL PHENOMENON, at Vii.
53. [1970] 2 All E.R. 33.
54. Id.
55. "[Petitioner] also described his sexual deviations. From a comparatively early age, he
had experienced a desire to dress up in female clothes . . . he had done so in the presence of
his wife on a few occasions. Subsequently, he had dressed as a woman four or five times a
year . . . and the urge to do so continued." Id. at 37. This passage describes the syndrome
known as transvestism; the act of dressing in the clothing of the opposite sex. It is usually
attributed to a psychological compulsion and is often practiced for the individual's general
sexual stimulation or to assist in the achievement of orgasm. GREEN & MONEY, at 487.
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sexual respondent since the court assumed that a valid legal mar-
riage required persons of opposite sex."
The respondent, George Jamison, was a male-to-female transsex-
ual posthumously named April Ashley. After working as a female
impersonator in Paris, respondent's incessant desire to become a
woman was finally realized. A sex-change operation was performed
in which the testicles and parts of the scrotum were removed and
an artificial vagina was created. Subsequently respondent lived as
a woman and met petitioner, Arthur Corbett. Petitioner, married at
the time, and subsequently divorced, became "mesmerized" with
the respondent," a condition which continued for the following three
years until the parties were married. At that time the petitioner
knew that April had been born and raised as a male and had under-
gone a sex change operation. Three months later the parties sepa-
rated, having been together for no more than fourteen days since the
marriage ceremony. Arthur Corbett filed a petition for a declaration
that the marriage was null and void because the respondent was of
the male sex, or alternatively for a decree of nullity on the ground
of non-consummation. April answered, requesting a decree of null-
ity on the basis of either the petitioner's incapacity or willful refusal
to consummate the marriage.
In an exhaustive and fascinating opinion, Judge Ormrod, a medi-
cal doctor as well as a judge,58 gathered a considerable wealth of
expert medical evidence on transsexualism."9 Judge Ormrod deter-
mined that since marriage is essentially a relationship between a
man and a woman, the validity of the marriage depended on
whether the respondent was or was not a woman. The court then
considered what was meant by the word "woman" in the context of
a marriage. 0
Judge Ormrod determined that:
. . . The Respondent has been shown to have XY chromosomes
and, therefore, to be of male chromosomal sex; to have testicles
56. Corbett v. Corbett, [1970] 2 All E.R. at 48f. For a discussion of marriage between
members of the same sex see comment, Same Sex Marriage and the Constitution, 6 U. CAL.
D. L. REv. 275 (1973).
57. Corbett v. Corbett, [1970] 2 All E.R. at 37j.
58. Judge Ormrod is a highly esteemed physician in the specialty of forensic medicine. 3
ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL BEH. 33, 47 (1974).
59. "An unusually large number of doctors gave evidence in the case, amounting to no less
than nine in all, including two medical inspectors to the Court . . .The quality of the medical
evidence on both sides was quite outstanding, not only in the lucidity of its exposition, but
also in its' intellectual and scientific objectivity . . . Corbett, supra note 57, at 35e-g.
60. Id. at 48f.
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prior to the operation and therefore, to be of male gonadal sex; to
have had male external genitalia without any evidence of internal
or external female sex organs and, therefore, to be of male genital
sex; and psychologically to be a transsexual . . . Socially, by
which I mean the Respondent is living in the community, she is
living as and passing as, a woman more or less successfully. Her
outward appearance, at first sight, was convincingly feminine, but
on closer and longer examination in the witness box it was much
less so. The voice, manner, gestures and attitude became increas-
ingly reminiscent of the accomplished female impersonator. The
evidence of the medical inspectors and of the medical doctors who
had an opportunity during the trial of examining the respondent
clinically, is that the body, in its post-operative condition, looks
more like a female than a male as a result of very skillful surgery.
Professor Dewhurst, after his examination, put his opinion in these
words-'the pastiche of femininity was convincing'. That, in my
judgment is an accurate description of the respondent. It is com-
mon ground between all the medical witnesses that the biological
sexual constitution of an individual is fixed at birth (at the latest),
and cannot be changed either by the natural development of or-
gans of the opposite sex, or by medical or surgical means. The
respondent's operation, therefore, cannot affect her true sex. . . ."
Having regard to the essential heterosexual character of the rela-
tionship which is called marriage, the criteria must, in my judg-
ment, be biological . . . In other words, the law should adopt, in
the first place the first three of the doctors' criteria," . . . i.e., the
chromosomal, gonadal and genital tests, and if all three are con-
gruent, determine the sex for the purposes of marriage accord-
ingly. 3
The judge concluded that sex is determined at or before birth and
that April must be designated as male, for marriage depends on sex,
not on gender." He stated that April continued to be a male and
61. Id. at 46-47.
62. The criteria of sex enumerated by the Corbett court are as follows:
(i) Chromosomal factors
(ii) Gonadal factors
(iii) Genital factors (including internal sex organs)
(iv) Psychological factors
(v) Hormonal factors and secondary sex characteristics
Id. at 44.
63. Id. at 48h.
64. Id. at 49d. See supra note 2.
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could not perform the "essential role of a woman in marriage.""
Accordingly, the marriage was deemed void ab initio."
American Cases
In Anonymous v. Weiner," a New York court took an analogous
approach to that used in Corbett. A postoperative male-to-female
transsexual applied to the New York City Bureau of Vital Statistics
(a division of the New York City Health Department) for a change
in sex designation on her birth certificate, seeking issuance of a new
birth certificate rather than amendment of the original certificate."
The pertinent city ordinance permitted the issuance of a new birth
certificate when the evidence showed "that an error was made at the
time of preparing and filing of the certificate."" The Board of
Health elected to resolve the issue by consulting the New York
Academy of Medicine to determine if an error had indeed been
made. An august body of specialists was gathered including gyne-
cologists, endocrinologists, cytogeneticists, psychiatrists, and a law-
yer. The Committee concluded that:
65. Id. at 48h. For a critical examination of the meaning of the ambiguous phrase "the
essential role of a woman in marriage," within the context of family law, see 56 CORNEL. L.
REv., at 1006; 7 CONN. L. REv., at 318. Such an analysis is beyond the scope of this note.
66. The Corbett decision has been extensively criticized for its harsh and inflexible attitude
towards transsexuals, particularly in its prospective application to issues other than the right
to marry. See 56 CORNELL L. REV., at 1006; 7 CONN. L. REV., at 316-22; 31 MD. L. REV., at
244-47; Kennedy, Transsexualism and Single-Sex Marriage, 2 ANGLo-AM. L. REv. 112 (1973).
For a discussion of a distinction made by Judge Ormrod in Corbett in regards to a previous
case see Comment, Sex and Gender, 1 LANcrr 405, 406 (1970). In that case a woman had a
genital defect making intercourse difficult if not impossible, precluding an "essential role of
a woman in marriage". It was held that the marriage was not null and void if an artificial
vagina could be surgically constructed. However, Judge Ormrod indicated that he would
differentiate between enlargement of an existing but defective vagina (relying upon the pre-
cedent of the earlier case of S. Y v. S. Y.) and the construction of an entirely artificial vagina
(which occurs in the sex reassignment procedure for male transsexuals).
The distinction between sex and gender drawn by Judge Ormrod is particularly relevant
to the issues presented by transsexuals desiring to compete in athletics, as athletic perform-
ance, too, depends on sex, not gender. A postoperative transsexual participant will compete
with the advantages afforded by physical characteristics associated with sex, not with psy-
chological orientation and anatomical physique which merely simulates the newly adopted
sex, and is more properly equated with gender orientation. Consequently, the chromosomal,
gonadal and genital tests of sex, mandated in the Corbett decision as standards of sex appro-
priate in the marital context are equally appropriate to the athletic milieu as standards to
be satisfied in determining legal sex for athletic competition.
67. 270 N.Y.S.2d 319, 50 Misc. 2d 380 (1966).
68. The normal method of changing birth certificates by the New York Bureau of Vital
Statistics was by amendment, where a line is drawn through the information subject to
amendment and the correct information is written above it. Id. at 323, 50 Misc. 2d at 383.
69. Id.
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1) Male-to-female transsexuals are still chromosomally males
while ostensibly females.
2) It is questionable whether laws and records such as the birth
certificate should be changed and thereby used as a means to help
psychologically ill persons in their social adaptation.
The committee is therefore opposed to a change of sex on birth
certificates for transsexualism.
. . . The desire of concealment of a change of sex by the transsex-
ual is outweighed by the public interest for protection against
fraud. 0
In accordance with the decision of the New York Academy of
Medicine, the agency denied petitioner's application for the issu-
ance of a new birth certificate, stating that, "Sex can be changed
where there is an error . . . but not where there is a later attempt
to change psychological orientation of the patient and including
such surgery as goes with it.""
Petitioner persevered, seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the
change and the issuance of a new birth certificate under Article 78
of the New York Practice Law and Rules. There the court was con-
fined to the issue of whether the Board of Health acted in an
"arbitrary, capricious or otherwise illegal manner"" in reaching
their decision. Predictably, the court deferred to the decision ren-
dered by the Board of Health, concluding that no basis existed for
the relief requested, thereby tacitly adopting the chromosomal test
of sex.
The holding in Weiner was the topic of reproach in a subsequent
New York case, In the Matter of Anonymous." There, the lower
court lacked the jurisdiction to order a birth certificate change since
the action required a writ of mandamus but considered the issues
implicit in a request for a change of name. In an eloquent and
compassionate opinion, Judge Pecora disagreed with the conclu-
sions of the Weiner court, stating:
A male transsexual who submits to a sex-reassignment
[operation] is anatomically a female in fact. This individual
dresses, acts and comports himself as a member of the opposite sex
70. Id. at 322, 50 Misc. 2d at 382. The panel from the New York Academy of Medicine has
published its report on which the Board of Health based its decision. See Report, Change of
Sex on Birth Certificates for Transsexuals, 42 BULL. N.Y. AcAD. MED. 721, 723-24 (1966).
71. 270 N.Y.S.2d at 322, 50 Misc. 2d at 382.
72. Id. at 323, 50 Misc. 2d at 383.
73. 293 N.Y.S.2d 834, 57 Misc. 2d 813 (1968).
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. . . It would seem to this Court that the possibility of so-called
fraud, if any, exists to a much greater extent when the birth certifi-
cate is permitted, without annotations of any type, to classify this
individual as a "male" when, in fact, as aforesaid, the individual
comports himself as a 'female'."
Furthermore, Judge Pecora proposed a more humane formula for
sexual status than the Weiner court, advocating a psychological
rather than a chromosomal test for changes of a statistical nature.
He stated:
Where there is disharmony between the psychological sex and
the anatomical sex, the social sex or gender of the individual will
be determined by the anatomical sex. Where, however, with or
without medical intervention, the psychological sex and the ana-
tomical sex are harmonized, then the social sex or gender of the
individual should be made to conform to the harmonized status of
the individual and if such conformity requires changes of a statisti-
cal nature, then such changes should be made."
Such an enlightened and sensitive approach to the difficulties
faced by postoperative transsexuals is characteristic of a more lib-
eral attitude towards transsexualism, but this holding is expressly
limited to the grant of an application for a name change. In granting
a male-to-female transsexual a change of name, a New York court
later stated:"
Therefore, the application is granted. However, the order to be
entered thereon will provide that the order shall not be used or
relied upon by Petitioner as any evidence or judicial determination
that the sex of Petitioner has in fact been changed."
Consistent with this opinion is Matter of Hartin v. Director of
Bureau of Records," where the court upheld a Board of Health
decision granting a change of name on a birth certificate while omit-
ting any designation of sex on the certificate. The court noted the
Board of Health's opinion that radical surgery on transsexuals is
done to alleviate the patients' mental condition, but that it does not
change the body cells governing sexuality," i.e., the chromosomes.
Concurrent with the more permissive approach with respect to
74. Id. at 835, 57 Misc. 2d at 814.
75. Id. at 837, 57 Misc. 2d at 816.
76. In re Anonymous, 314 N.Y.S.2d 668, 64 Misc. 2d 309 (1970).
77. Id. at 670, 64 Misc. 2d at 311.
78. 347 N.Y.S.2d 515, 75 Misc. 2d 228 (1973).
79. Id. at 517-18, 75 Misc. 2d at 230-31.
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transsexualism is the New Jersey case of M. T. v. J. T.5 0 The wife, a
male-to-female transsexual, filed a complaint for support and main-
tenance. The husband interposed the defense that the wife was a
male and their marriage was void. Unexpectedly, the court departed
from the traditional Corbett rationale and held that the plaintiff
should be considered a member of the female sex for the limited
purpose of marriage. The court declared that, ". . . if the anatomi-
cal or genital features of a genuine transsexual are made to conform
to the person's gender, psyche or psychological sex, then identity by
sex must be governed by the congruence of these standards."" The
court went on to conclude:
Consequently Plaintiff should be considered a member of the fe-
male sex for marital purposes. Such a recognition based upon
medical judgment and irreversible action will promote the indi-
vidual's quest for inner peace and happiness, while in no way dis-
serving any societal interest, principle of public order or precept
of morality."
However, the New Jersey court noted the limited practicality and
scope of the psychological and anatomical (phenotype) test:
The evidence before this Court teaches that there are several cri-
teria or standards which may be relevant in determining the sex
of an individual is unquestionably significant and probably in
most instances indispensable. For example, sex classification of an
individual at birth may as a practical matter rely upon this test.
For other purposes, however, where sex differentiation is required
or accepted, such as for . . . services in the branches of the armed
forces, participation in certain regulated sports activities, eligibil-
ity for types of employment and the like, other tests in addition to
genitalia may also be important."
Foreign Cases
Foreign jurisdictions have approached the issue of a transsexual's
legal sex with a comparatively conservative tone.
The Argentinian case of Ricardo San Martin," in which a doctor
was prosecuted for performing a sex change operation, adopted a
80. 140 N.J. Super. 77, 355 A.2d 204 (1976).
81. Id. at 87, 355 A.2d at 212.
82. Id. at 90, 355 A.2d at 214.
83. Id. at 86, 355 A.2d at 211. (emphasis added).
84. 123 La Ley 605 (C.N. Crim. y. Correc. Argen. 1966) (discussed in English in Strauss,
Transsexualism and the Law, 3 CoMP. & INTL. L.J. S. AFR. 348, 351-53 (1970)). See also
Comment, supra note 14, at 979-81.
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chromosomal criterion for sex determination: "He was a man and
would continue to be so until the day he dies. No female chromatin
bodies were found in his cellular nuclei."" In addition, the court
suggested that legal sex is determined by the ability to procreate:
Mankind would subsist although every man in this world were to
have his arms cut off, were to lose his property, his honor and his
fatherland . . .The action of the accused absolutely defies all that
nature imposes. He knew that he could not change a man into a
woman; he attempted to simulate this. However far medicine ad-
vances, it can never violate the secrets of creation-procreation
and death."
A West German case" involving a postoperative male-to-female
transsexual seeking a change of birth certificate (to avoid possible
prosecution for homosexuality) held that the court did not have the
competence to order an alteration of the birth certificate which
correctly reflected the sex of the applicant at the time of birth. The
applicant did not make out a case justifying an alteration of the
birth certificate:
Although . . . there is the theoretical possibility that hormone and
genetic factors may be involved in the causation of such a situa-
tion, they are not yet identifiable according to scientific knowledge
presently available . . . As long as the science of medicine does not
provide a generally acceptable explanation of the origin and the
conditions for development of transvestism [transsexualism] a
person of the said kind cannot be classified legally to the opposite
sex after an operation had changed his appearance."
The thrust of this decision is that the West German court refused
to adopt a psychological approach to sex. Instead, it took the posi-
tion that the sex change operation merely achieves a simulation of
the opposite sex, and that sex should be determined by the immuta-
ble chromosomal arrangement and the phenotype manifested at
birth.
The East German courts are aligned with those of West Germany
in their rejection of the psychological test of sex to classify trans-
sexuals. The Hamburg journal Polizei carried an article on
85. Strauss, supra note 84, at 352.
86. Id.
87. 22 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1476-1577 (Oberlandesgericht, Frankfurt, West Ger-
many 1969) (discussed in English in Note, Sex Change Operations and the Law, 87 S. AFR.
L.J. 239-40, Strauss, supra note 84, at 358 (1970) and; Meyers, Problems of Sex Determina-
tion and Alteration, 36 MEDICo- LEGAL J. 174, 180 (1968)).
88. Note, supra note 87, at 174-90.
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Rechtsprobleme der Intersexualiat."5 This article discussed the deci-
sion of a Berlin court which denied a postoperative transsexual a
change of sex status for the purpose of altering a passport. The court
was of the opinion that the basic legal criterion for sex determina-
tion was the individual's natural physical condition at the time of
his birth rather than subsequent physical changes that might occur
in the individual due to a mixture of behavior patterns, medication,
or operative procedures."o
Scotland, in conformity with the English Corbett case, refused to
adopt the psychological test of sex as determinative of a postopera-
tive transsexual's legal sex. In an unreported case," where a post-
operative transsexual sought a change of birth certificate, the Scot-
tish court determined that it was unable to amend the entry of the
individual's birth since the statute at issue dealt with the correction
of errors made at the date of entry, not made wrong due to subse-
quent changes. The court held that:
Skin and blood tests still show X's basic sex to be male and that
the changes have not yet reached the deepest level of sex determi-
nation. It seems to me accordingly that while X could be described
as an abnormal male, it would not be possible to describe him as
a female. I do not think that the Register can be corrected because
of some subsequent change of circumstances. The Register is es-
sentially a record of fact at a fixed time: it is not, and is not
intended to be, a narrative of events.92
South African courts have taken a more progressive approach to
transsexuals than the nations previously discussed. One writer" has
indicated that South Africa permits alterations of birth certificates
after surgical intervention and marriage, indicating that the psy-
chological approach to sex has been adopted for the limited purpose
of marriage and statistical change.
Switzerland has also adopted the psychological test of sex for a
postoperative transsexual, as described in the Swiss journal
Schweizische Medizinische Wochenschrift.11 In this case, the sub-
89. 1967 (July-Aug.) Excerpta Criminologica (s 1099) (discussed in Meyers, supra note 87,
at 174-90).
90. Id.
91. No. 35 Scots Law Times 61 (Sept. 28, 1957).
92. Id.
93. Note, supra note 87, at 239.
94. This article appearing in 1963 was entitled Change of Sex by Surgical Operation and
Subsequent Legal Recognition of the Female Status of a Transvestite. 1963 (Excerpta Crimi-
nologica) 430 (in Meyers, supra note 87, at 174).
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ject was married and the father of one son. Subsequent to his self-
mutilation (presumably self-castration, which is common to trans-
sexuals who cannot obtain proper treatment)," operative castration
was carried out. After obtaining a divorce, the patient succeeded in
having his genitals operatively transformed to the female sex (i.e.,
creating an artificial vagina by inlay grafting and plastic surgery)."
As a result, the patient was able to have her newly-acquired female
status sanctioned by a court of law.
As early as 1945 a Swiss court had examined the issue of a trans-
sexual's legal sex and concluded that psychological sex had to be
accepted as the legal standard when accompanied by surgical reas-
signment:" "Now that the patient's psychic association with the
female sex is strongly supported by anatomical changes it appears
to us impossible to go back. It would therefore be advisable to recog-
nize legally a state which the law did not prevent from coming into
existence.""
The court reasoned that:
This aversion (to male clothing, genitalia, etc.) may even lead to
self-mutilation . . . or to castration . . . It is clear that it is not
an ordinary vice which can lead to such extremes and that the
subject must be driven to them by inner forces beyond his control.
This inclines us to attribute to the psychic element, in the deter-
mination of sex, an importance at least equal to that of the physi-
cal element . . . In granting him the civic status of a woman we
are satisfying the most profound desire to his well-being while
consolidating his psychic and moral equilibrium; at the same time
we are facilitating his social adaptation by permitting him to lead
a more normal type of life than heretofore. The personal interest
which urges him to ask for a change of civic status is thus not
opposed to the interests of public order and morality-quite the
contrary."9
It seems apparent that foreign jurisdictions have responded in a
similar vein as American courts to the legal issues raised by trans-
sexuals. With the exception of Switzerland, which legally recognizes
the new sex of a postoperative transsexual for all purposes, other
95. See supra note 1.
96. See supra note 26.
97. In re Leber (Neuchatel Cantonal Ct.,.July 2, 1945) (decision reprinted in full in E. DE
SAVITSCH, HOMOSEXUALITY, TRANSVESTISM AND CHANGE OF SEx, 96-107 (1958). Also discussed
in Comment, supra note 14, at 971-72).
98. E. DE SAvITSCH, supra note 97, at 100.
99. Id. at 104-05.
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countries have failed to reclassify the legal sex of a transsexual to
conform with the new appearance. Despite the fact that exceptions
are made for changes of a statistical nature, or for marriage, the
majority of foreign decisions discussed are still guided by the im-
mutable chromosomal composition to determine the legal sex of a
transsexual.
The Liberal Trend
It is indeed encouraging to see the emergence of a sympathetic
attitude towards transsexuals in our courts. This is exemplified by
the liberalization of the legal requirements for social ascriptions
such as name change, change of legal identity on official records, the
right to marry, etc., all of which have a negligible effect on society
at large. Additionally, several states have allowed transsexuals to
receive Medicaid benefits for their sex-change operations. For ex-
ample, in the recent cases of Doe v. Lackner0 and G.B. v. Lackner'e
the California Court of Appeal overruled the State Department of
Health and declared that all medical services involved in transsex-
ual surgery were payable under the state Medi-Cal program. The
state had refused to pay for the surgery claiming that these opera-
tions were merely "cosmetic" and therefore not covered under the
Medi-Cal program. However, in ruling on the evidence, the appel-
late court found that the surgery was both necessary and reasonable.
The court stated that transsexualism is an illness and the sex
change procedure was the only effective means to treat that ill-
ness. 02 In granting the Medi-Cal benefits the court said: "We do not
believe, by the wildest stretch of the imagination, that such surgery
can reasonably and logically be characterized as cosmetic." 0o
Following this liberal trend, Minnesota'0n and Georgia"' have also
100. Doe v. Lackner, 1 Civ. 42125 (Cal. Ct. App., 1st Dist., 3d Div. filed Apr. 20, 1978).
101. G.B. v. Lackner, 1 Civ. 41363 (Cal. Ct. App., 1st Dist., 3d Div. filed Apr. 20, 1978).
102. Doe v. Lackner, supra note 100, at 6; G.B. v. Lackner, supra note 101, at 10.
103. Doe v. Lackner, supra note 100, at 6 (paraphrasing G.B. v. Lackner, supra note 101,
at 10). In response to these two cases S.B. 2200 was introduced in the California Legislature
by Senator Paul Carpenter and Senator Campbell as part of the WELF. & INST. CODE to read:
"1 14137(1) No payment shall be made under this chapter for the costs of cosmetic surgery,
including sex change operations." S.B. 2200 (1978).
104. The Minnesota Supreme Court in Doe v. Minn. Dep't. of Pub. Welf., 257 N.W.2d 816
(1977) held that the total exclusion of transsexual surgery from eligibility for medical assis-
tance was void for several reasons: First, absolute exclusion of coverage for transsexual sur-
gery contravenes federal regulations against arbitrary denial of funds to an eligible individual
solely because of diagnosis, illness or condition. Second, coverage was improperly denied
because medical necessity was equated with a guarantee of surgical success. Third, the
standard adopted by the state Welfare Department associated the requirement of medical
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ruled that sex reassignment surgery is within the scope of state
medical assistance benefits for those who have or intend to undergo
a sex-change operation.
Furthermore, a number of states'"' have enacted statutes permit-
ting the postoperative transsexual to obtain a new, rather than
amended birth certificate. California has recently adopted Health
and Safety Code Statutes §§ 10475-10479 authorizing revision of
birth certificates to reflect surgically accomplished changes of sex.o,
It reads in pertinent part:
§ 10475-Revision of Birth Records to Reflect Change of Sex
Whenever a person born in this state has undergone surgical
treatment for the purpose of altering his or her sexual characteris-
tics to those of the opposite sex, a new birth certificate may be
prepared for such person reflecting the change of gender and any
change of name accomplished by an order of a court of this state
A petition for the issuance of a new birth certificate in such
necessity with the removal of an applicants name from the welfare rolls, a requirement the
court found "ludicrous". Id. at 821. Accordingly, the case was remanded to the District Court
with instructions to order the Department to grant the Appellant medical assistance benefits
to finance the surgery.
105. In Rush v. Parham, 440 F.Supp. 383 (N.D. Ga. 1977), the Georgia court granted
summary judgment for plaintiff in a suit challenging the Georgia Department of Medicaid
Services' denial of an application for Medicaid reimbursement for sex reassignment surgery
expenses. The court held that the requested surgery for a true transsexual is medically
necessary (when certified by the attending physician in consultation with the patient) and,
as such, may not be considered optional or discretionary under the Georgia Medicaid pro-
gram. The court enjoined the defendant State from applying the departmental exclusion for
coverage of sex reassignment surgery and ordered it to approve plaintiffs application for
Medicaid reimbursement.
Two New York cases concerning transsexual surgery have not held that the state is bound
by the opinion of the attending physician as to the medical necessity of the surgery. Denise
R. v. Lavine, 383 N.Y.S.2d 568, 347 N.E.2d 893 (1976); In re Vickers v. Toia (N.Y. Sup. Ct.,
May 1977) (in 1977 MEDICAID AND MEDICARE GUIDE, New Developments, (CCH) § 28,507). In
Denise R. the court held that the state was not required to pay for transsexual surgery where
a conflict existed as to medical necessity. The court reached this result notwithstanding
testimony from the treating physician that the surgery was a life or death matter. In Vickers
the court held that the determination of the state agency denying medicaid benefits was not
arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious since the evidence offered by the applicant's psychia-
trist fell short of the "matter of life or death" testimony offered in Denise R. Since the
application in Denise R. was denied in the face of such testimony, the application in Vickers
with a lesser showing of necessity was also denied.
106. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 2, §73-17(d) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1967). (New Certificate
of Birth), LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:61 (West 1969). (Issuance of New Birth Certificate after
Anatomical Change of Sex by Surgery); ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 36-326(4). (New Certificates of
birth following . . . surgical alterations).
107. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 10475 (West 1977) (emphasis added).
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cases shall be filed with the superior court of the county where the
petitioner resides."'
Such legislative and judicial assistance facilitating the transsex-
ual's metamorphosis to a new sexual role reflects the sensitive atti-
tude of the legal profession to this unique syndrome, while simulta-
neously chiseling at the precedential value of previous cases.
Although some courts have shown a marked reluctance to issue
new birth certificates, others have responded with alacrity to the
legal needs of transsexuals, applying the psychological/phenotype
test to permit birth certificate changes, marriage, support and
maintenance, and state medical assistance benefits for sex reassign-
ment procedures. The legislatures have also been active, passing
statutes that permit a postoperative transsexual to obtain either a
changed or new birth certificate with a minimum of difficulty. In-
deed, denial of such requests would, in effect, constitute punish-
ment for those individuals who had finally received relief from an
intolerable sexual role by attaining a state the law did not prevent
from coming into existence.
These cases had been consistent in their view that the sex reas-
signment procedure does not and cannot change the essential sex of
an individual. Until Richards, the courts had limited their holdings
to a grant of such peripheral relief as was requested within the
context of the marital relationship or petitions for statistical
changes. However, they had exercised restraint by their recognition
of the fact that physical appearance would change, but the essence
of sex was not changed by the sex reassignment procedure.
The decision in Richards v. U.S. T.A. was an inconsistent depar-
ture from this trend. It not only held that a postoperative transsex-
ual had actually changed sex in accordance with the psychologi-
cal/phenotype test, but the test was formulated within a context
where other persons' rights would be directly affected by that reclas-
sification. As previously stated, it does not follow that the standard
which is suitable to define legal sex for one purpose will necessarily
be suitable to define sex for another dissimilar purpose.
The Olympic Test of Sex
In response to differential abilities and sports performance ratios
between the sexes,"o' segregation of athletic contests by sex has been
108. Id.
109. Such differentiation is common and finds its expression in such sports as tennis and
golf on both the amateur and professional levels. See also supra note 16.
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both a desirable and necessary goal. On an international level, the
Olympic Committee segregates sports by sex, with the exception
that men and women compete together in Olympic yachting,
equestrian and shooting events."o The rationale espoused by the
United States Olympic Committee for separation of the sexes in the
majority of events, is that it insures the matching of persons of equal
strength."'
For many years the International Olympic Committee has found
it necessary to discriminate between the sexes on a nonphenotypic
basis to prevent the introduction of inequality and unfairness into
athletic contests. This was precipitated by deliberate attempts on
the part of nations to enter imposters into women's events and by
innocent competitors with chromosomal disorders (unknown to
them) which blurred the distinction between the sexes."' The phen-
otype test of sex (observation of primary and secondary sexual char-
acteristics) was not used by the International Olympic Committee
to classify the sex of participants, due to its unreliability (physical
appearance is not an immutable characteristic, being subject to
alteration by the ingestion of hormones). Furthermore, this test was
inapplicable to those individuals with the organs of both
sexes-hermaphrodites, or those individuals with other chromoso-
mal abnormalities. Also, the phenotype test was objectionable as a
screening device because of the possibly offensive and alienating
effect an intimate physical exam would have on potential competi-
tors."l3
The psychological test of sex was not a useful standard for the
International Olympic Committee because it is necessarily subjec-
tive, and therefore difficult and time-consuming to administer on an
international level. Furthermore, it was held that despite the fact
that anatomy in the postoperative transsexual would conform to
psychological self-image, this test was inadequate to designate sex
where the participant intended to compete against others on the
basis of physical ability. Lastly, a letter from the competitor's doc-
110. Experts Say Competitive Advantage Holds for MD Tennis Star Despite Sex Change,
Medical Tribune, Sept. 22, 1976.
111. Id.
112. U.S.T.A., Statement on Sex Determination at U.S. Open Tennis Championships
(Aug. 25, 1976), Richards v. U.S.T.A., 400 N.Y.S.2d 267 (1977) (Exhibit B). See also Hay,
supra note 15, at 998.
113. Affidavit of George W. Gowen at 11, Richards v. U.S.T.A., 400 N.Y.S.2d 267 (1977).
[hereinafter cited as Gowen Affidavit].
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tor attesting to the sex of a "female" athlete was not deemed relia-
ble because the possibility of fraud was too great."'
Consequently, the chromosomal test (Barr body and karyotype
test)"' was adopted by the International Olympic Committee as a
legitimate, efficient and justifiable screening requirement for par-
ticipants in International events."' In pertinent part the Interna-
tional Olympic Regulations for Femininity Control provide:
4.4.9 As a screening test, the determination of X-chromatin will
be conducted on a smear of buccal mucous membrane.
4.4.10 If the test is inconclusive, the competitor must undergo
further tests as determined by the IOC Medical Commission (kary-
otyping).
4.4.12 Should the results of these tests require it . . . a physical
examination can be prescribed and performed by a physician gyne-
cologist . . .
4.4.13 The Medical Commission will issue a femininity certifi-
cate to those competitors whose test results are conclusive."'
Although the chromosomal test does not measure such characteris-
tics as muscle-to-tissue ratio, skeletal size, etc., it does accurately
identify the genetic sex of the individual and hence predicts the
presence of certain physical characteristics that distinguish and are
unique to a particular sex. For example, in a normal male the chro-
mosomal test would reveal an XY chromosomal arrangement. From
this one would infer that the individual had a male skeletal struc-
ture, male hormonal balance, male muscular configuration, male
114. U.S.T.A. statement, supra note 112 and, The Second Time Around for Renee, New
York Times, Apr. 16, 1977, Sports at 19, col. 1.
115. See notes 39-46 & accompanying text supra.
116. The chromosomal test of sex was "first" administered for international competition
at the time of the 1966 European Track and Field Championships. In the 1968 Olympic
Summer Games and Olympic Winter Games, selected athletes from each of the women's
individual sports teams were chosen to undergo the test. Now all women competitors partici-
pating in Olympic women's sporting events must undergo this chromosome test. Letter to
author from the United States Olympic Committee (Sept. 12, 1977).
In addition to the International Olympic Committee other sports federations, have adopted
the Olympic test for sex; such as the Rome Open (tennis). Renee Richards Fails Sex Test for
Rome Open, N.Y. Times, May 15, 1977, Sports at 8, col. 4. The Paris Open (tennis) has also
adopted the chromosome test as a condition to participation in that tournament. 4 Set
Victory For Solomon in France, N.Y. Times, May 25, 1977, Sports at 22, col. 3.
117. Games of the XXI Olympiad, Montreal 1976, International Olympic Committee Med-
ical Controls, Rules 4.4.9-4.4.13 at 53.
Rule 4.4.1 provides: "The result of this examination (femininity control) will not be made
public out of deference to the human rights of the individual."
Under Rule 4.4.7: a valid certificate of femininity issued by the IOC Medical Commission
or International Federation during World Championships or Continental Championships will
be dispositive of the question of a competitor's femininity.
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anatomical structure, and other attendant features associated with
a male phenotype.
In the case of a male-to-female transsexual, the chromosomal test
would indicate that despite the feminine appearance or psychologi-
cal orientation of the individual, the genotype is male and the at-
tendant features have the properties of the male sex (however, these
are subject to dilution by the ingestion of hormones). Proponents of
the chromosomal test as a legal determinant of sex for sports claim
that the transsexual who has competed in athletic events as a male
will have a competitive and training advantage over many women
who have played only as women."' Although the muscular develop-
ment of a male will be affected by transsexual surgery and the
ingestion of estrogens,"' some experts contend that the degree of
muscular development or atrophy is only partial and will depend on
the age of the male at the time of the surgery and the intensity of
the hormone treatment.'20 Furthermore, neither removal of the
testes, nor any subsequent treatment with estrogen can affect the
individual's achieved height or skeletal structure."' Thus, a nega-
tive chromosomal test in a transsexual (denoting the presence of the
Y or male chromosome) may indicate certain immutable and resi-
dual physical characteristics associated with the male sex which
would bestow that phenotypic female with the competitive advan-
tage of male size and musculature. Consequently, proponents find
the Olympic test of sex desirable as it classifies the male-to-female
transsexual as a male, regardless of psychological orientation or
physical appearance.
However, experts differ on the subject. Opponents of the chromo-
somal test contend that, when applied to transsexuals, the chromo-
somal test indicates only that the genetic constellation of the indi-
vidual is male and does not reflect residual traces of masculinity as
none exist. They feel that sex reassignment surgery and its compan-
118. See Experts Say Competitive Advantage Holds for MD Tennis Star Despite Sex
Change, Medical Tribune, Sept. 22, 1976; U.S.T.A. Position on Transsexuals (March 25,
1977), Richards v. U.S.T.A. 400 N.Y.S.2d 267 (1977) (Exhibit 12).
119. Removal of the testes, the main source of androgen (male hormones) significantly
decreases the male hormones in the blood and results in a decreased muscle mass. Addition-
ally, the transsexual is taking estrogens to develop feminine characteristics which will alter
muscle configuration even further. See generally, Hamburger, Endocrine Treatment of Male
and Female Transsexualism, in GREEN & MONEY, at 291-304.
120. Federman Affidavit at 5. Dr. Daniel Federman is a professor and Chairman of the
Department of Medicine at the Stanford University School of Medicine.
121. Memorandum of Points and Authorities for Defendant U.S.T.A. at 32; Memorandum
of Points and Authorities for Defendant W.T.A. at 7-8.
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ion endocrinological treatments produce a genuine panacea-an
individual with a decreased muscular mass, height, weight, and
physique well within the female norm."' They contend that despite
the negative chromosomal test, the transsexual has the appearance
of a woman having had a hysterectomy and ovariectomy (i.e., pan-
hysterectomy) and the external genital appearance, gonadal ident-
ity, endocrinological makeup, and psychological and social develop-
ment of a female. Therefore, they argue that the chromosomal test
is inappropriate when applied to classify the sex of a transsexual,
for it bears no reasonable relationship to any physical characteris-
tics associated with the residual genotype, now sequestered from
any attributes of masculinity. Indeed, to classify this individual as
a male when anatomically and psychologically the person appears
to be female, is incongruous for most social situations."' It has been
argued that sex is a composite of factors which must be considered
in toto to determine the sex of a transsexual, rather than allowing
one factor, the chromosomes, to be dispositive of a very delicate and
critical issue-despite this test's apparent utility within the athletic
milieu.
It is apparent from these alternative viewpoints that the chromo-
somal test of sex, as employed by the International Olympic Com-
mittee is not indefectible, attracting legitimate controversy and
debate. This is an area of first impression in both the medical and
legal fields. Nevertheless, whatever test is eventually dispositive of
the sexual status of a transsexual for athletic purposes, it should
emulate, not emasculate the general moral and ethical objective
that is the foundation of the Olympics: that sport should involve the
matching of skill and strength based upon the natural capabilities
of participants.'2 4 While an individual's right to live his or her life
and do as he/she may choose must be honored and respected, such
122. Affidavit of Roberto Granato at 1-2. [hereinafter cited as Granato Affidavit]. (Dr.
Granato is a physician and surgeon licensed to practice in the state of New York and is the
doctor who performed the sex change operation on plaintiff Renee Richards.) Affidavit of
John Money at 4-5. [hereinafter cited as Money Affidavit]. (Dr. Money is a psychologist,
presently serving as a professor and practitioner at Johns Hopkins Medical School in Balti-
more, Maryland.) Affidavit of Dr. Leo Wollman at 2. [hereinafter cited as Wollman Affida-
vit]. (Dr. Wollman is an acknowledged authority in the field of transsexualism, currently in
private practice in the state of New York. He has had extensive experience treating transsex-
uals, having personally treated over 1700 transsexual patients. Dr. Wollman was an expert
witness in In re Anonymous, supra note 73. See also Moore, supra note 18, at 163.
123. See In re Anonymous, supra note 73 at 835.
124. Games of the XXI Olympiad, Montreal 1976, International Olympic Committee Med-
ical Controls at 15.
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rights should not be allowed to contravene the basic maxims of
competitive athletics.
Richards v. United States Tennis Association
Introduction
In Richards, the court was required to determine the relative
superiority of the Olympic test as opposed to the psychological test
as dispositive of the sex of a transsexual for athletic purposes. The
United States Tennis Association (U.S.T.A.), United States Open
Committee'" (U.S.O.C.), and Women's Tennis Association
(W.T.A.) had adopted the chromosomal test as a condition of com-
petition in the United States Open Tournament at Forest Hills,
New York. Plaintiff Renee Richards sought a preliminary injunction
in the New York Supreme Court to enjoin defendants use of the
chromosomal test which would have classified Richards as a male.
A substantial body of expert medical opinion was presented to the
court as well as to the pertinent legal authorities. The symbolic
scales of justice tipped, and despite the fact that the weight of the
evidence seemed to be in defendants' U.S.T.A. and W.T.A.'s favor,
the New York court found for Renee Richards.
This section will examine both the medical evidence and legal
authority presented to the Richards court'" within the context of the
evidentiary standards required for the issuance of a mandatory in-
junction in the state of New York. It will be shown that, in light of
the evidence presented, there was no basis for granting the injunc-
tion which allowed Renee Richards to play in the U.S. Open. Fur-
thermore, it will be shown that within the state of medical science
and the legal precedents there is no foundation to support the hold-
ing that the chromosomal test was inappropriate to classify the sex
of transsexual Renee Richards' as a condition for participation in
the U.S. Open Tennis Tournament.
125. The U.S.O.C. submitted a joint Memorandum of Points and Authorities with Defen-
dants U.S.T.A. (hereinafter collectively referred to as U.S.T.A.].
126. An analysis of the Richards case will be based upon the affidavits, exhibits and
Memorandum of Points and Authorities submitted to the court on behalf of plaintiff Renee
Richards and Defendants U.S.T.A., U.S.O.C., and W.T.A. (Index No. 14643/77, N.Y. Supr.
Ct.).
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Facts
On July 26, 1976, Dr. Renee Richards'" submitted an application
to the U.S.T.A. for the 1976 U.S. Open' at Forest Hills and a letter
to the tournament director'" clarifying her application'30 for the
women's singles events at the tournament. In response to Dr. Ri-
chards application, the President of the U.S.T.A. was advised by
legal counsel to ask Renee Richards to submit to a chromosome test
in accordance with the practice of the International Olympic Com-
mittee which requires the test as a condition to participation for
female competitors.''
The U.S.T.A. Management Committee subsequently decided
that the chromosome test used in the Olympics would be required
of all contestants in the 1976 U.S. Open, in order to prevent the
introduction of "inequality and unfairness into the Champion-
ships".' Dr. Richards did not take the test and was accordingly
barred from participation in the 1976 U.S. Open.' After making
127. Richards' affidavit disclosed that Dr. Renee Richards, nee Richard H. Raskind, an
opthamologist licensed to practice in the State of New York and earning an annual income
of $100,000.00, underwent a sex reassignment operation in 1975 at age 41. "At which time,"
she averred, "for all intents and purposes, I became a female, psychologically, socially and
physically, as has been attested to by my doctors. I underwent this operation after many years
of being a transsexual, a woman trapped inside the body of a man . . . Only for the sake of
my continuing healthy mental existence did I undergo the sex reassignment operation." 400
N.Y.S.2d at 267-268. Nevertheless, Dr. Richards was married at one time and has a child by
"her" ex-wife. Affidavit of Renee Richards at 2.
As Dr. Richard H. Raskind, plaintiff was an accomplished male tennis player. In 1974 he
ranked 3rd in the East and thirteenth nationally in the men's 35-and-over division. Subse-
quent to her sex reassignment surgery, Dr. Richards continued to play competitive tennis and
entered several women's tournaments. She won two tournaments and finished as runner-up
in three. Prior to the 1977 U.S. Open, Dr. Richards reached the finals of the women's singles
at the Mutual Benefit Life Open played on Aug. 7, 1977 at the Orange Lawn Tennis Club in
South Orange, New Jersey. 400 N.Y.S.2d at 268.
128. (Exhibit 2), file number 14643/77, 400 N.Y.S.2d 268. See Gowen Affidavit at 2; 400
N.Y.S.2d at 268.
129. Letter to Mike Blanchard, U.S. Open Chairman, from Renee Richards, (Exhibit 3),
400 N.Y.S.2d 268.
130. Dr. Richards stated that she had been a male at birth and had undergone sex reassign-
ment surgery in 1975. She asserted that in all anatomical respects she was a normal woman
and that her passport, birth certificate and all significant documents had been legally
changed to "Renee Richards," her legal name. Since the law and medical profession ostensi-
bly regarded her as a woman, she concluded: "I am a woman and entitled to all the legal
rights of my sex," and capriciously added, "I intend to pursue my right to play in the women's
singles at Forest Hills. Obviously I can't play in the men's event! " Id.
131. Gowen Affidavit at 3. See Letter from George Gowen to Stanley Malless, 1976 Presi-
dent of U.S.T.A. (July 27, 1976). (Exhibit 5).
132. Gowen Affidavit at 4. See U.S.T.A. Press Release (Exhibit 7). Gowen, general counsel
for the U.S.T.A., stated:
We have reason to believe that there are as many as 10,000 transsexuals in the
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this decision, the Management Committee reviewed the question of
whether it was fair to women tennis players to permit the entry of
transsexuals into womens' tournaments concluding:
While the Committee is sensitive to and respects the rights of
individuals to live as they may choose, it believes that a transsex-
ual retains characteristics of his earlier life that may give the trans-
sexual competitive and physical advantages over many women
. . . The Committee believes that it would be reasonable to adopt
an objective test to determine sex for purposes of athletic competi-
tions restricted to women and that the so-called Olympic chromo-
some (Barr body) test has a high degree of accuracy and is easily
administered without inconvenience or indignity to the individ-
ual.134
Despite this decision ratifying use of the Barr body test for the
U.S. Open, the U.S.T.A. permitted each tournament committee to
make its own determination as to whether it should use the chromo-
some test. Its reasoning was that "an absolute requirement as to the
use of the test would be burdensome."' 5 Dr. Richards was therefore
allowed to compete in a number of U.S.T.A. sanctioned tourna-
ments in the 1976-1977 tournament year which did not require the
chromosome test.'3 6 Although successful in these tournaments Ri-
chards was unable to qualify for participation in the prestigious
U.S. Open due to defendant U.S.T.A.'s failure to rate Renee Ri-
chards as a woman tennis professional, a prerequisite for partici-
United States and many more female impersonators or imposters. The total num-
ber of such persons throughout the world is not known. Because of the millions of
dollars of prize money available to competitors, because of the nationalistic desires
to excell in athletics and because of world-wide experiments, especially in the iron
curtain countries, to produce athletic stars by means undreamed a few years ago,
the U.S.T.A. has been especially sensitive to its obligation to insure fairness of
competition among the athletes competing in the U.S. Open, the leading interna-
tional tennis tournament in the United States. The U.S.T.A. believes that the
Olympic type sex determination procedures are a reasonable way to assure fairness
and equality of competition when dealing with numerous competitors from around
the world. The U.S.T.A. believes the question at issue transcends the factual back-
ground of medical history of one applicant. 400 N.Y.S.2d at 269.
133. Gowen Affidavit at 5.
134. U.S.T.A. Position on Transsexuals at 2. (Exhibit 12). Gowen Affidavit at 7. The basis
for this conclusion was that: 1) A transsexual playing competitive tennis as a male would have
a competitive and training advantage over other women; 2) The male-to-female transsexual
would probably have a muscular advantage over women playing only as women, notwith-
standing atrophy of the muscles as hormone treatment remains in the control of the individ-
ual. 3) The skeleton of a male is not altered by "sex change" surgery. Id.
135. U.S.T.A. Position on Transsexuals at 2. (Exhibit 12); Gowen Affidavit at 6-8.
136. For example, Eugene Scott, tournament chairman of the Mutual Benefit Life Open
in South Orange, New Jersey, invited Dr. Richards to play in the tournament as a woman
because, "I recognize her as a woman." Affidavit of Eugene Scott at 1.
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pation in the 1977 U.S. Open.' Consequently, Richards sought a
preliminary injunction'" barring use of the chromosomal test (which
would designate her as a male), "so that I shall be allowed to qualify
and/or participate in the United States Open Tennis Tournament
as a woman in the Women's Division."' 39
The Richards Decision
On August 10, 1977, Judge Ascione of the Supreme Court of New
York, County of New York found for Renee Richards. After a written
review of the pertinent medical evidence, affidavits of various pro-
fessional tennis players and exhibits, the court delivered its opinion
which reads in part:
137. The W.T.A. maintains a computerized system to rank professional and
amateur women tennis players. Weighted results from all W.T.A. approved events
are entered into the system in order to determine the rank of each woman player.
The W.T.A. has requested that each W.T.A.-approved tournament administer
the Barr body (chromatin) test and that only those individuals who pass the Barr
body test be allowed to participate in the tournament.
The W.T.A. will not knowingly enter into its ranking system the results of a
tournament which has not utilized the Barr body test as a condition for participa-
tion in the tournament or which admits a participant who has failed the test.
Affidavit of Jerry Diamond (Executive Director of the W.T.A.) at 1-2.
138. This was pursuant to N.Y. Civ. PRAc. §6301 which provides in part:
A preliminary injunction may be granted . . . in any action where the plaintiff has
demanded and would be entitled to a judgment restraining the defendant from the
commission or continuance of an act, which if committed or continued during the
pendency of the action would produce injury to the plaintiff.
To sustain Richards motion for a preliminary injunction under New York law, she was
required to demonstrate; 1) a clear likelihood of success on the merits, 2) irreparable injury
would result during the pendency of the lawsuit if a preliminary injunction were not awarded,
3) the balance of equities are in plaintiffs favor, and, 4) there is no adequate remedy at law.
Albine v. Solork Assocs., 37 App. Div. 2d 835, 326 N.Y.S.2d 150 (1971).
The effect of a preliminary injunction to the instant case was to give Renee Richards the
ultimate relief sought, i.e., she would be able to qualify and participate in the U.S. Open
without complying with the chromosome test requirement. However, the standards for a
preliminary injunction are more strictly employed where the injunction sought would award
the complete relief requested if the plaintiff were to prevail on the merits. Tanzer Econ.
Assocs. v. Universal Food Spec. Inc., 383 N.Y.S.2d 479, 87 Misc. 2d 167 (1976); Kaplan v.
Scal 108 N.Y.S.2d 624 (1952); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. §6312.06 (1976). It will be shown that Richards
failed to meet this higher evidentiary requirement for equitable relief yet incongrously was
able to obtain a mandatory injunction.
The scope of this analysis will be confined to an inquiry of whether Richards established a
likelihood of success on the merits, i.e., that the chromosome test was proved by clear and
convincing evidence to be unfair and inequitable when used to determine Richards sex for
athletic purposes. Therefore factors two, three and four of the requirements for a preliminary
injunction (listed above) will not be discussed since they fall within the ambit of equitable
jurisdiction rather than the substantive merits of the Richards opinion.
139. 400 N.Y.S.2d at 268.
In this Court's view, the requirement of defendants that this
plaintiff pass the Barr body test in order to be eligible to partici-
pate in the Women's singles of the U.S. Open is grossly unfair,
discriminatory and inequitable, and violative of her rights under
the Human Rights Law of this state (Executive Law, Article 15,
Sections 290 et. seq.). It seems clear that defendants knowingly
instituted this test for the sole purpose of preventing plaintiff from
participating in the tournament. The only justification for using a
sex determination test in athletic competition is to prevent fraud,
i.e. men masquerading as women, competing against women.
This court rejects any such suggestion as applied to plaintiff.
This court is totally convinced that there are very few biological
males, who are accomplished tennis players, who are also either
preoperative or postoperative transsexuals.
When an individual such as plaintiff, a successful physician, a
husband and father, finds it necessary for his own mental sanity
to undergo a sex reassignment, the unfounded fears and miscon-
ception of defendants must give way to the overwhelming medical
evidence that this person is now a female.
This court is not striking down the Barr body test as it appear
to be a recognized and acceptable tool for determining sex. How-
ever, it is not and should not be the sole criterion, where as here,
the circumstances warrant consideration of other factors. 4 0
In accordance with section 290, subd. 3 and section 296 of the
Human Rights Law of the state of New York, the Supreme Court
found defendants U.S.T.A., U.S.O.C. and W.T.A. in violation of
plaintiffs rights"' and Richards' application for a preliminary in-
140. 400 N.Y.S.2d at 272-73.
141. An application for a preliminary injunction must be based upon a valid cause of
action. Leonard v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 118 N.Y.S.2d 170, aff'd 281 App. Div.
859, 119 N.Y.S.2d 918 (1953). Richards based her application for injunctive relief upon § 290
and § 296 of the New York Human Rights Law which, among other things, prohibits discrimi-
nation on the basis of sex. However, sex discrimination as the foundation for this decision
raises portentious questions regarding its validity as a substantive basis for the Richards
decision. Transsexuals, terminated from their jobs because they had changed or were in the
process of changing sex, have brought suit in federal court basing their cases on Title VII of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act. This act prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of sex.
The courts have consistently held that no cause of action is stated for sex discrimination since
the alleged discrimination is based on a sex change. In one case, the trial court, restricting
sex to its "plain meaning" stated:
In the absence of any legislative history indicating a congressional intent to include
transsexuals within the language of Title VII, the Court is reluctant to ascribe any
import to the term "sex" other than its plain meaning. Accordingly, the Court is
satisfied that the facts as alleged failed to state a claim of unlawful job discrimina-
tion based on sex. Grossman v. Bernhards Township Bd. of Educ., 11 Empl. Prac.
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junction was granted. By granting the relief requested, the court
implicitly held that Richards had satisfied the requirements for a
preliminary injunction, i.e., that Richards had shown a likelihood
of success on the merits. However, an examination of the medical
evidence submitted to the court will show that Richards failed to
establish the strict requirements for injunctive relief, despite a find-
ing to the contrary.
The Medical Arguments
The court's application of the medical evidence was both superfi-
cial and fallacious; in disregard of many of the fine yet crucial,
medical issues implicit to a determination of the sex of Renee Ri-
chards. The written opinion of the court made no reference to any
particular medical information which was significant in their ulti-
mate disposition of the case. The court merely stated that the cir-
cumstances warranted consideration of factors other than the chro-
mosomes to determine Richard's sex."' What the specific circum-
stances were and which factors required consideration were not in-
cluded in the opinion. Further, an analysis of the medical informa-
tion presented and the state of that art reveals major discrepancies
in the medical evidence presented by Richards which did not meet
the strong showing of proof required for a mandatory injunction.
Rather, it seems apparent that the court based its conclusion upon
the emotional appeal of Renee Richards' case, triggered by her un-
usual and difficult transition from one sexual role to the other.'43
Dec. (CCH) T 10,686 at 6889 (D.N.J. 1975) aff'd mem., 538 F.2d 319 (3rd Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 897 (1976).
Another court has noted that had Congress intended to prevent discrimination on the basis
of transsexualism the Act would have specifically included discrimination based on "change
of sex" or "sexual preference." Voyles v. Ralph K. Davies Medical Center, 403 F. Supp. 456
(N.D. Cal. 1975) [on appeal to 9th Circuit]. Accord Holloway v. Arthur Anderson & Co.,
No. 76-2248 (9th Cir., Dec. 23, 1977); Powell v. Read's Inc., 436 F. Supp. 369 (D. Md. 1977).
As a corollary to the reasoning used in the Title VII cases, W.T.A. similarly argued that
there was no legislative history or statutory language indicating an intent on the part of the
New York legislature to include transsexuals within the ambit of the New York Human Rights
Law. Consequently W.T.A. asserted that the Supreme Court of New York should not ascribe
any meaning to the term "sex" other than its plain meaning, W.T.A. Memoranda of Points
and Authorities at 13-14, and therefore these statutes were inadequate as the basis for award-
ing injunctive relief as they were not intended to apply to transsexuals being discriminated
against on the basis of a sex change. At the very least this issue entailed consideration by
the court, however, it too was ignored in the court's opinion.
142. 400 N.Y.S.2d at 273. See text accompanying notes 140-141, supra.
143. For example, note the sympathetic posture of this decision:
When an individual such as plaintiff, a successful physician, a husband and father,
finds it necessary for his own mental sanity to undergo a sex reassignment, the
unfounded fears and misconceptions of defendants must give way to the over-
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First, the court based its conclusion upon the testimony of Drs.
Money, Granato, Rubbell and Wollman (Richards' experts) who
concluded that Richards was a woman and must be classified as
such.' 4 In contrast, Dr. Federman (the medical expert for U.S.T.A.
and W.T.A.) took the more accurate medical position that Dr. Ri-
chards was not a biological female; rather, the sex reassignment
process had merely produced a simulation'5 of the female sex and
therefore Richards still had the essential chromosomal composition
of a male.' As previously discussed, the sex reassignment proce-
dure has never been regarded by medical science as one which
changes the "core" sex of an individual but is a procedure which
alters physical appearance so that it will conform to psychological
orientation. In this respect Richards' authorities deviated from com-
mon medical opinion for the "widely held conclusion of modern
medicine" would be that transsexual Renee Richards was not a
biological female as Richards argued.' 7 Rather, the opinion of Dr.
Federman was the more complete and accurate statement of Renee
Richards' status. However, Dr. Federman conducted no medical
examination of Richards (unlike Richards' experts), relying solely
upon the papers and affidavits submitted by Dr. Richards'8 to for-
mulate his opinion. Consequently, the Supreme Court of New York
found Dr. Federman's affidavit limited in probative value to a gen-
eral consideration of the applicability of the Barr test' and held
that the "overwhelming medical evidence would indicate that
Renee Richards is female . . . ."
Despite the probative limitation placed on Dr. Federman's testi-
mony, his opinion was in accord with the stance of modern medi-
whelming medical evidence that this person is now a female.
400 N.Y.S.2d at 272.
144. Id. at 271-72.
145. Some experts contend that the transsexual tries to simulate the female sex psychologi-
cally as well as anatomically. These authorities feel that the urge of a transsexual male to be
"all woman" is normally the result of a shallow and distorted view of what a woman is really
like socially, sexually, anatomically and emotionally. Worden & Marsh, Psychological Fac-
tors in Men Seeking Sex Transformation, 157 JAMA 1292, 1293 (1955) (cited in Meyers,
Problems of Sex Determination and Alteration, 36 MEDICO-LEGAL J. 174 (1968).
''In others [transsexuals], however, there is the need to overdo and exaggerate the femi-
nine appearance and thus their behavior becomes a caricature of women's behavior. This
clinical impression is confirmed by psychological studies which show that the male transsex-
ual as a group score higher femininity scales than a control group of normal women." Pauly,
Manifestations of Male Transsexualism in GREEN & MONEY, at 44.
146. 400 N.Y.S.2d at 271-72.
147. Id. at 272.
148. Federman Affidavit at 2.
149. 400 N.Y.S.2d at 269.
150. Id.
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cine, in contravention to the position promulgated by Richards' four
medical experts. Although it appeared from the onset that the
"overwhelming medical evidence" indicated that Richards was a
female (since four out of five experts testified to that effect), the
evidence was technically imprecise. It would have been more appro-
priate for the court to consider the quality of the evidence in weigh-
ing Dr. Federman's testimony As opposed to the quantity of evi-
dence.
Secondly, Drs. Money and Wollman criticized the Barr body test
as being medically inaccurate for individuals with chromosomal
anomalies and therefore inequitable for purposes of excluding indi-
viduals on the basis of sex.'"' Richards' doctors had been prejudi-
cially selective in their attack, criticizing the inaccuracy of the Barr
body test while ignoring the fact that the Barr test was merely a
screening device that formed a part of the composite chromosomal
test at issue. The Barr body test was never intended by the U.S.T.A.
or W.T.A. for exclusive use, but was to be paired with the karyotype
test.'" Although Dr. Federman conceded the inaccuracy of the Barr
body test, he established that the karyotype test, used in conjunc-
tion with the Barr body test, is 100% effective in revealing chromo-
somal anomalies.153
By selectively focusing upon the Barr body test, Richards ap-
peared to purport a sound legal argument and avoided the real
issue, the soundness of the composite chromosomal test. The court
disregarded this discrepancy, holding that "although the Barr body
test is an acceptable tool, it should not be the sole criteria for deter-
mining sex". 54 The defendants had never contested this finding but
had come to the same conclusion as the Richards' court. The defen-
dants contended that the Barr body test was not an absolute crite-
rion, but if abnormal, had to be followed by the definitive karyotype
test. Clearly then the Olympic chromosomal test of sex was an
accurate indicator of Richards' sex for athletic purposes, but had to
be considered in its entirety, and not solely on the basis of the
screening component of the test (i.e. the Barr body test).
Thirdly, Drs. Money and Granato attested that Renee Richards
151. Id. at 271-72.
152. Defendants U.S.T.A., U.S.O.C., and W.T.A. specifically provided for use of the kary-
otype test in the event the results of the Barr body test were inconclusive: "If a player fails
the Barr body test and requests further consideration, the W.T.A. will permit the use of the
karyotype test." Affidavit of Jerry Diamond at 2.
153. 400 N.Y.S.2d at 270.
154. Id. at 273.
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had no competitive advantage over other women as her muscle-to-
tissue ratio was that of a woman.' Dr. Federman disagreed, arguing
that the effect of sex reassignment is partial and Richards still had
residual male characteristics which could give her a competitive
advantage. Therefore, he concluded that the Barr body test was
appropriate to determine Richards sex since it identifies the chro-
mosomes that reflect the nature of those immutable physical char-
acteristics still housed in the altered body of the transsexual.
These contentions concerning the possible competitive advantage
Renee Richards might have over her competitors were ignored by
the court which found that the only justification for the Barr body
test was to prevent fraud in the form of men masquerading as
women. Evidently, unfairness in the form of an unnatural competi-
tive advantage was found to be inconsequential. However, fraud was
one, but not the sole concern that militated towards adoption of the
test. The primary purpose for which the Barr body test was chosen
by the I.O.C. and then the U.S.T.A. and W.T.A. was to prevent
unfairness in whatever form it might assume - whether in the
shape of a simple masquerade, chromosomal anomaly or true trans-
sexual. I'
The opinion reveals that the court ignored U.S.T.A.'s and
W.T.A.'s contention that fairness in athletic competition was of
paramount importance, and juxtaposed the parties' intent with an
intent the court subjectively deemed more prudent (although fac-
tually discordant with the evidence submitted) i.e., that the Barr
test was relevant only to prevent fraud in the athletic setting. The
court was not warranted in disregarding the overwhelming evidence
showing that unfairness could result if transsexual Renee Richards
were allowed to compete in the U.S. Open and that the Barr test
bore a reasonable relationship to that end. By ignoring the unfair-
ness issues pertinent to athletic competition, the court rendered
obsolete a consideration of the inequities a replacement test might
have in sex segregated sports. For example, the psychological/
phenotype test would allow a transsexual with an innate physical
advantage to compete against others. Hay,' writing for the Medi-
cal Commission of the 1972 International Olympic Committee, Ex-
planada, Mexico, reported that there is a substantial percentage
difference in effort and endurance between the sexes. And, as pre-
155. Id. at 271-72.
156. Id. at 272.
157. Hay, supra note 15, at 998.
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viously cited,"8 other studies on male animals indicate that where
castration and hormonal changes are artificially induced, there are
traces of residual masculine characteristics in the altered animal
that consist of, but are not limited to, a higher level of strength and
aggression than the level normally maintained in the female. All
this bears witness to the fact that an altered transsexual is likely to
retain the inherent physical characteristics associated with his/her
previous anatomical configuration, which will give him/her a com-
petitive advantage over other participants. Since biological differ-
ences influence athletic performance, the chromosomal test, which
is reasonably related to the biological characteristics of an individ-
ual, is preferred over the psychological/phenotype test, which
merely indicates the psychological orientation and physical appear-
ance of the transsexual.
The defendants had shown that the chromosomal test was an
objective and acceptable tool for determining sex as it indicates the
biological differences which have an uncontested influence on ath-
letic performance. The chromosomal test was not promulgated as an
arbitrary requirement, but was reasonably related to the objective
of the U.S.T.A. and W.T.A. to prevent unfairness, a genuine exi-
gency on the basis of the medical evidence and the state of that art.
Therefore, it can be seen that the court erred in holding that imple-
mentation of the Barr body test was merely a gesture designed to
discriminate against Renee Richards.'"
Lastly, the court based its decision for Richards upon the specula-
tion that there were very few biological male tennis players who
were either preoperative or postoperative transsexuals.10
In fact, the evidence presented established a contrary finding,
that there are as many as 10,000 transsexuals in the United States.''
Furthermore, as mentioned previously,' 2 Pauly has reported that
transsexualism is far more prevalent than the figures indicate since
any statistical count is based only upon those transsexuals who seek
treatment for their syndrome.
Assuming for a moment that the court was correct in asserting
that there are few transsexual tennis players of the caliber of Renee
Richards, there nevertheless must be transsexual golfers, gymnasts,
158. See supra note 38.
159. 400 N.Y.S.2d at 272.
160. Id.
161. See supra note 132.
162. See supra note 4.
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runners, and other transsexual athletes who would enjoy a competi-
tive advantage if they too were classified as female by the psycholog-
ical/phenotype test. Certainly these issues will be raised again. The
role of the Richards' court was not merely to decide one case, but
rather, to set guidelines and precedent for future cases - a task the
court failed to undertake when it made its' superficial examination
of the medical issues attendant to a determination of the legal sex
of transsexual athlete Renee Richards.
The Legal Arguments
Richards asserted that, in accordance with the legal precedents
dealing with transsexuals, she must be classified as a woman. She
relied upon M. T. v J. T.163 which held that a male-to-female trans-
sexual subsequent to sex reassignment surgery was a member of the
female sex for marital purposes, despite the fact that the transsex-
uals chromosomes were that of a male. There, the New Jersey court
stated that the chromosomal test of sex did not serve to prevent
fraud where "in actuality, she [the transsexual] is doing her ut-
most to remove any false facade""' by seeking to be classified as
female when she appeared in every regard to be female. Richards
argued that she too was a female in all respects, with the exception
of her chromosomes as demonstrated by the medical evidence.'"
Since she presented no danger of fraud or unfair advantage, she
asserted that she too should be classified as a woman.
Had the court examined M. T. v. J. T.'" (a case Richards claimed
was "strikingly similar to the one at bar")" it would have seen that
the issue there concerned the validity of a marriage between a posto-
perative male transsexual and not the legal sex of a transsexual for
athletic purposes. The court expressly held that where a transsex-
uals' anatomy conforms with the person's gender, psyche, or psy-
chological sex, then sexual identity must be governed by the congru-
ence of these standards.'" This decision reflected both the deep-
rooted public policy prohibiting dissolution of a functional marriage
163. 140 N.J. Super. 77, 355 A.2d 200 (1976). This case litigated the validity of a transsex-
ual's marriage in an action for support and maintenance brought by the transsexual wife. See
notes 80-83 & accompanying text supra.
164. Id. at 88, 355 A.2d at 210.
165. Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Support of the Application for a Preliminary
Injunction at 6.
166. Supra note 163.
167. Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 165, at 5.
168. See M.T. v. J.T., supra note 80. See also notes 80-83 & accompanying text supra.
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and a liberal trend acknowledging the marital rights of transsexuals
within the confines of family law. However, it did not hold that male
transsexuals were to be categorized as women for all purposes. In-
deed, the court expressly stated in dictum that the psychologi-
cal/phenotype test was inadequate for athletic purposes:
It is true that the anatomical test, the genitalia of an individual is
unquestionably significant and probably in most instances indis-
pensable . . . For other purposes however, where sex differential-
ism is required or accepted, such as for . . . participation in cer-
tain regulated sports activities . . . other tests in addition to geni-
talia may also be important."'
Furthermore, in consideration of the high standard of proof neces-
sary for injunctive relief, this New Jersey case should have held
little precedential value to the New York court. Had the court ex-
amined the parties' contentions, it would have found that within the
context of the marital relationship, conflict exists as to whether a
transsexual can actually change her sex through reassignment sur-
gery, based on the medical authority presented in Corbett.'"I On the
basis of that decision (which nullified a marriage between a male-
to-female transsexual and a normal male on the ground that a valid
marriage can only be between persons of opposite sex) defendants
asserted that "a medical operation cannot change the sex of a trans-
sexual".'
Richards also argued that In the Matter of Anonymous" and In
re Anonymous,' cases where a transsexual was allowed to change
a male name to a female name, indicated that a psychological test
should be applied when classifying the sex of a postoperative trans-
sexual for athletic purposes. This test would have the effect of clas-
sifying Richards as a woman. She argued that no danger of fraud
existed since social sex or gender would conform to her harmonized
physical status. Richards further asserted that the chromosome test
was both unrealistic and inhumane as a determinant of sex based
169. 140 N.J. Super. at 82, 355 A.2d at 209.
170. [19701 2 All E.R. at 33.
171. Memorandum of Defendants United States Tennis Association, Inc., and U.S. Open
Tennis Championship Committee in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for a Preliminary In-
junction at 26.
172. 293 N.Y.S.2d 834, 57 Misc. 2d 813 (1968) (lower court lacked jurisdiction to order birth
certificate change but ordered change of name while considering attendant issues). See notes
73-75 & accompanying text supra.
173. 314 N.Y.S.2d 668, 64 Misc. 2d 309 (1970) (court granted an application for a change
of name from an obivously male name to an obviously female name). See notes 75-78 &
accompanying text supra.
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upon the holding of Judge Pecora in In the Matter of Anonymous:
[S]hould the question of a person's identity be limited by the
results of mere histological section or biochemical analysis, with a
complete disregard for the human brain, the organ responsible for
most functions and reactions, many so exquisite in nature, includ-
ing sex orientation. I think not."'
Consequently, Richards urged adoption of the psychological test
contending that use of this test was equally applicable to the case
at bar.
Had the court examined these cases or the defendants' arguments
it would have seen that they were specifically limited to their facts
and had no application to the issues pertaining to sex classification
of transsexual athletes.
The decision in In the Matter of Anonymous which promulgated
the psychological test of sex for a transsexual seeking a change of
name was expressly limited by Judge Pecora to changes of a statisti-
cal nature."' And In re Anonymous was also limited in scope to a
statistical change of sex designation on a birth certificate and was
therefore ineffectual to support the contention that Richards' sex
had in fact been changed.
A further examination of In re Anonymous discloses that Ri-
chards' application of that case was incorrect both factually and
legally. In that case, the court expressly stated that the order grant-
ing permission for the petitioner's change of name was not to be
used as evidence that the sex of petitioner had in fact been
changed."' Consequently, U.S.T.A. commented in its memoran-
dum that the factual data offered by Richards indicating a change
of name on her birth certificate, passport and California Driver's
License were meaningless as evidence of a change in sex."'
Indeed, W.T.A. added that the New York In re Anonymous court
indicated in dictum the inadequacy of the psychological/phenotype
test for determining the sex of participants in sex-segregated ath-
letic events:"
174. 293 N.Y.S.2d at 838, 57 Misc. 2d at 817. See Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 105,
at 9.
175. Id. at 835, 57 Misc. 2d at 813.
176. 314 N.Y.S.2d at 668-70, 64 Misc. 2d at 309-10. See note 77 & accompanying text
supra.
177. Memorandum of Defendants, supra note 171, at 26-27. See Affidavit of Renee Ri-
chards at 4.
178. However, W.T.A. ignored the fact that the Anonymous court was merely taking judi-
cial notice of past Olympic practice rather than determining the propriety of the Olympic
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What the true test of a person is, commonly is easy of determina-
tion by the application of accepted tests based on visual inspec-
tion. Occasionally refinements of these tests are required, as have
been reported to have occurred during the Olympic games when
chromosome testing was applied to contestants whose sex was dis-
puted in contests reserved for women."'
U.S.T.A. indicated 8 1 that Matter of Hartin v. Director of Bureau
of Records'"' was not supportive of Richards' assertion that she was
a woman. There the court upheld a Board of Health decision grant-
ing a change of name on a birth certificate for a transsexual. The
court held that the main purpose of reassignment surgery was not
to effectuate a change of sex since it could not change the body cells
governing sexuality,'82 but was done to alleviate the patient's mental
condition. Additionally, the New York case of Frances B. v. Mark
B.,183 held that a female-to-male transsexual despite sex reassign-
ment surgery Was still a female in fact and therefore her marriage
to a woman was invalid. Consequently, U.S.T.A. concluded that the
legal precedents had consistently failed to hold that a transsexual
subsequent to sex reassignment surgery had converted sex.
W.T.A. and U.S.T.A. conceded that some of the cases had al-
lowed a change of sex designation for gender-blind social ascriptions
such as name changes and changes of legal identity while another
case, M. T. v. J T.,'" had even upheld the right of a transsexual to
marry. However, they asserted that these previous cases were distin-
guishable from the present case since none of the former dealt with
situations where the effect of classifying a male-to-female transsex-
ual would materially affect the rights of other persons. U.S.T.A. and
W.T.A. argued that classifying Richards as a female for athletic
purposes would materially affect the rights of her female competi-
tors since the medical evidence indicated that she was likely to have
a competitive advantage.
Nevertheless, the court, which failed to rely on any of the cases
cited, concluded:
When an individual such as plaintiff, a successful physician, a
husband and father, finds it necessary for his own mental sanity
test and mandating what shall be done in the future with regard to transsexuals in athletics,
an issue not before the Anonymous court.
179. 314 N.Y.S.2d at 668, 670, 64 Misc. 2d at 309, 310.
180. Memorandum of Defendants, supra note 171, at 22-23.
181. 347 N.Y.S.2d 515, 75 Misc. 2d 229 (1973). See notes 78-79 & accompanying text supra.
182. Id. at 517-18, 75 Misc. 2d at 232.
183. 355 N.Y.S.2d 712, 78 Misc. 2d 112 (1974).
184. Supra note 163.
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to undergo a sex reassignment, the unfounded fears and miscon-
ceptions of defendants must give way to the overwhelming medical
evidence that this person is now female."'
Had the court consulted the legal precedents they might well have
concluded that Renee Richards is not and would not be legally
classified as a female in the state of New York by the psychological
test for other than statistical purposes. Nevertheless, the court con-
cluded that Renee Richards was a woman in accordance with the
medical evidence and without regard to the legal precedents. Osten-
sibly, the psychological/phenotype test was deemed an appropriate
determinant of this fact.
Renee Richards went on to play tennis in the 1976 U.S. Open at
Forest Hills.' However, this result was not justified within the
context of the evidentiary requirements for injunctive relief since it
was dubious that Richards had shown a likelihood of success on the
merits. As one New York court has stated:
Injunction is a drastic remedy; the granting of a mandatory injunc-
tion, in the first instance, is rare. Even an injunction pendent lite
will be refused unless a clear and convincing case is made out.'
The medical evidence revealed discrepancies on a number of
major points regarding the utility of the chromosome test to deter-
mine the legal sex of transsexual athlete, Renee Richards. First,
there was conflicting authority on the issue of whether or not Ri-
chards was a female in fact or merely a simulation of a woman.
Second, there were discrepancies concerning whether or not Ri-
chards had a competitive advantage over other female participants
because of innate physical characteristics. Third, there was conflict-
ing evidence on the accuracy of the chromosomal test. Fourth, there
was unfounded speculation, with no statistical documentation, on
the number of transsexuals in the United States, a factor which
appeared to be influential to the ultimate outcome of the case.
As shown, a virtual cornucopia of conflicting medical and legal
evidence had been presented which militated against the award of
injunctive relief. The legal authorities cited by Richards as evidence
that her sex should be classified by a psychological test were not
185. 400 N.Y.S.2d at 272.
186. Generally a preliminary injunction is issued to preserve the status quo pending a final
determination of the merits of the cause of action after a full hearing. Here plaintiff Renee
Richards sought a mandatory injunction and obtained the full relief requested at the injunc-
tion stage. Consequently no final hearing ensued and stipulated dismissal was entered by the
parties.
187. Kaplan v. Scal, 108 N.Y.S.2d 624 (1952).
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only discordant, but distinguishable on their facts so as to render
them inapplicable to the issues attendant to classifying Richards'
sex for athletic purposes. In fact, the majority of Richards' authori-
ties held that Richards would not be classified as a female by the
psychological test for other than statistical purposes. Indeed, it is
patent that Richards was not able to establish in a clear and con-
vincing manner a likelihood of success on the merits in order to
qualify for the mandatory injunction requested. Nevertheless, the
New York Supreme Court awarded the requested injunctive relief.
It is evident that in balancing the symbolic scales of justice, the
court attributed greater weight to humanistic considerations than
evidentiary standards.
Conclusion
The biblical dichotomy of the sexes has been a fundamental as-
sumption recently challenged by modern medicine. The sexes are
not discrete, but rather composed of a mosaic of factors which may
blend into a spectrum of individuals with chromosomal and hor-
monal anomalies. At the extreme end of this spectrum is the trans-
sexual presenting a myriad of novel legal problems that require an
examination of the subtle nuances of sexuality in order to facilitate
their smooth transition into society without impairing the rights of
others. As one court has stated in recognizing a change of sex on the
part of a transsexual for the limited purpose of marriage:
. . . Such recognition would promote the individual's quest for
inner peace and personal happiness, while in no way disserving any
societal interest, principle of public order or precept of morality.'
The scales of justice failed to strike such a harmonious balance
in Richards v. U.S. T.A. when the New York Supreme Court con-
cluded that transsexual Renee Richards should be classified by a
psychological test of sex for purposes of competing in the U.S. Open
Tennis Tournament.
On a superficial level, the Richards decision does not seem to
impair any moral precept, principle of public order, or societal inter-
est. Rather, it seems relatively innocuous, merely lifting the yoke
imposed by the chromosome test and allowing Renee Richards to
play tennis. Yet within the context of the athletic milieu, this deci-
sion stands to impose upon the fairness and integrity of competitive
sports.
188. M.T. v. J.T., supra note 163, at 211.
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The basic maxim of athletic competition in accordance with the
International Olympic Committee, is that sport should involve the
matching of skill and strength based upon the natural capabilities
of participants.'" As shown, the relative performance of a female
competitor will be in jeopardy when paired with a male transsexual
competitor. Regardless of the fact that Renee Richards has not dev-
astated womens' tennis,'" she nonetheless possesses certain immut-
able physical characteristics unique to "her" male sex which affords
her an access to qualities not available to other participants.
The threat that competitive sports may be impaired by the Ri-
chards' holding has been shown to be more than idle sophistry.
Although transsexual Renee Richards is a novel anomaly to the
American sports scene, she represents a small but ever-increasing
group of transsexual athletes or those with chromosomal disorders
that have appeared in other nations. Inevitably other transsexuals
will want to participate in competitive athletics in this country and
they too will need to obtain a legal determination of sex for athletic
purposes.
It is evident that the Richards' court was not concerned with the
impact this decision might have upon competitive tennis and per-
haps other sex-segregated sports as well, but their concern focused
upon the desire of this one plaintiff, Renee Richards, to compete in
the U.S. Open Tennis Tournament. The role of the Richards' court
should have extended beyond a decision for Renee Richards. Rather,
the court should have formulated a decision which would have pro-
vided consultative and precedential value to future courts called
upon to balance the divergent legal and medical authority, the
needs of the transsexual athlete, and the social impact such a deci-
sion will have.
As discussed, the Richards' court ignored pertinent medical data,
failed to distinguish the legal authorities, and ignored the eviden-
tiary standards required for injunctive relief in New York. Although
substantively deficient, the Richards' decision will nonetheless in-
fluence future courts called upon to decide the legal sex of a trans-
sexual athlete. The danger of the Richards' decision is that it does
not have a substantive basis in fact, but will nevertheless reverber-
ate far beyond the holding which allowed Renee Richards to com-
pete in the 1977 U.S. Open.
189. Games of the XXI Olympiad, Montreal 1976, International Olympic Committee Med-
ical Controls at 15.
190. Affidavit of Renee Richards at 3.
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